MEETING

STATE LANDS COMMISSION

State Capitol

Room 2170

Sacramento, California

OPIGINAL

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1977

10:00 A.M.

C.S.R. License No. 3434

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ì	MEMBERS PRESENT
2	Hon. Kenneth Cory, Controller, Chairman
3	Mr. Sid McCausland, representing Roy M. Bell
4	Ms. Betty Jo Smith, representing Mervyn M. Dymally
5	MEMBERS ABSENT
6	Hon. Mervyn M. Dymally, Lieutenant Governor
7	Hon. Roy M. Bell, Director of Finance
8	STAFF PRESENT
9	Mr. William F. Northrop, Executive Officer
10	Mr. Richard S. Golden, Assistant Executive Officer
11	Mr. Robert C. Hight, Chief Counsel
12	Mr. Brian Sway, Legislative Coordinator
13	Mr. James F. Trout
14	Mr. Wilbur M. Thompson
15	Mr. Donald J. Everitts
16	Mr. Allen D. Willard
17	Mr. Donald L. Hoagland
18	Ms. Diane Jones
19	ALSO PRESENT
20	Mr. Jan Stevens, Deputy Attorney General
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PROCEEDINGS

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CHAIRMAN CORY: We will call the meeting to order.

Are there any corrections or additions to the minutes of the August 25th meeting? Without objection, they will be confirmed as presented.

The report of the Executive Officer.

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman and members, before you you have AJR-54, which is sponsored by Assemblyman Kapiloff. It memorializes the President of the United States regarding the problems that we're having in California just keeping our heads above water on crude oil prices and the fact that we face a real threat that, given the Alaskan import treatment, production from the Wilmington field could by the end of 1979 or early 1980 -- certainly by 1981 -- be totally uneconomic, and our production, rather than being 100,000 barrels a day, as it is now, would be zero. I think that AJR-54 deserves support from the Commission.

Secondly, along the lines of the last problem

I just stated, the staff of the Energy Commission and the chief of staff of the Department of Consumer Affairs -we've had several meetings discussing this problem -- and they all seem supportive of our action. Also, I understand the Chairman has arranged a meeting with the Water Resources and the state colleges and universities to put together a

program to allow us to continue producing the oil. I will report as that progresses.

This week we received notice of three legislative oversight hearings involving the State Lands Commission.

The first hearing, on October 13th, will be an Assembly Resource, Land Use, and Energy Committee hearing reviewing the state's role in resolving boundary disputes involving tide and submerged lands.

Senator Nejedly has called for two hearings by his Natural Resources and Wildlife Committee of the Senate. The first of these hearings, entitled "Management of the State's Sovereign and Granted Lands -- Inland Lakes and Streams", will be held November 3rd at South Lake Tahoe. A second hearing by the Senate Resources and Wildlife Committee will focus on the title problems in the Delta. Division staff has begun to work with both committees in preparation for these hearings. As soon as final arrangements have been completed, you will be notified.

We have some potential problems over the use of state lands for filming motion pictures. Section 14998 of the Government Code provides for the Motion Picture Development Council to issue permits and establish fees to be paid for the use of all state-owned property for the making of commercial motion pictures. Chapter 1395 of 1976 added a new section, which requires the approval of the Director

of General Services, with the concurrence of the state agency concerned, on application by the Motion Picture Development Council for the use of state-owned property.

All fees collected are to be deposited in the Motion Picture Development Council account within the special fund for reimbursement to the operating departments for their actual additional costs and for the support of the council.

Council activities are such that little if any lead time is provided for state agencies to respond. Request are usually for filming to be accomplished within a few weeks at the most of the notice. The law as passed preempts the State Lands Commission's authority and responsibility both as to uses of property under its jurisdiction and for collecting a fair rental.

Response from the council to Division concerns has been less than satisfactory, and filming has proceeded on the Gaviota Pier without Commission approval. Current efforts are under way to film the proposed blow-up of the Marriott Hotel Pier at Santa Barbara without ample time for State Lands Commission to act formally upon the matter. It may be necessary to ask you to take formal action if the Commission is to maintain control over the lands under its jurisdiction. I will keep you advised on that.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Blow up what?

MR. NORTHROP: They're going to blow up a pier for

1	a television series, and we got notice on that last week.
2	It's mind-boggling. If you blow up the pier, what pre-
3	cautions have been taken just to make sure we're not out
4	there in punts picking up pieces that have been blown up.
5	That's the problem. Certainly it's employment-producing,
6	but the problem is that when they do gross things like this
7	CHAIRMAN CORY: How are they planning on getting
8	those portions of pilings upon which the pier is resting
ò	MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, we have no idea how
10	they're planning on doing that, or whether that's even been
11	considered. We've got all kinds of problems. What happens
12	to the snags that are left?
13	CHAIRMAN CORY: We've got some federal money for
14	the snags.
15	(Laughter.)
16	MR. NORTHROP: Only in inland waterways.
7	MR. McCAUSLAND: May I ask what kind of response
18	you've received to date on your inquiries?
19	MR. NORTHROP Mr. Trout can address himself to
20	that.
21	MR. TROUT: Mr. McCausland, the basic response
22	has simply been that the Legislature gave all authority
23	over all state lands to the Motion Picture Development
24	Council, and would we please get out of the way.

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MR. McCAUSLAND: I don't think that's a satisfactory

response.

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MR. TROUT: I think we agree with you. And the people at Marriott are quite concerned too, because it appears that this outfit is just kind of steamrolling over everybody.

The council was set up to encourage motion pictures to be made in California rather than Italy, but it is a real problem.

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, at the August meeting the Commission authorized the Executive Officer and the Office of the Attorney General to take appropriate action to effect the timely filing of an application for reduction in the 1977 assessment of the Long Beach Unit with the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Boards.

Participants owning 99 percent of the participating shares in the Long Beach Unit, including all who own shares in the offshore portion, authorized the State Lam s staff to act as their agent for the purpose of signing the application and appearing before the Assessment Appeals Boards in this matter. On September 15th, the Division filed the application for reduction of the 1977 assessment.

The offshore contractors are authorized by contract to pass an average of ninety-six and one-quarter percent of their proprietary and mining rights taxes through their net profits accounts, so that in effect state tideland

oil revenue is being reduced by that amount. The assessor increased the Long Beach Unit assessment by 40 percent in 1977, based on the assessor's opinion of fair market value, which is a projection of future revenue. The Division asserts there is no basis in fact for the 40-percent revenue increase in view of the continuing federal price controls on crude oil, which we discussed earlier, and considering that nearly \$100 million of value was extracted from the Long Beach Unit since the 1976 valuation was made.

As the Commissioners are already aware, an estimated 20 barrels of crude oil --

MR. McCAUSLAND: Wait a second. Let's go back. That's a heavy item also.

Where are we then at the present time? Are we before the Appeals Board?

MR. NORTHROP: We're before the Appeals Board at the present time.

MR. McCAUSLAND: When is that set for hearing?

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Thompson of our staff --

MR. THOMPSON: We really don't know. They're still receiving all those protests and will have some kind of filing date for proceedings.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Would we have an opportunity to be briefed on what our case is before we proceed with that if time allows?

MR. NORTHROP: Yes.

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CHAIRMAN CORY: There are two factors in that.

One, there is an obscure code section which allows anybody in Los Angeles County to file an appeal, and if the Appeal Board does not increase the assessed value, because of the relative position of Los Angeles County to the statewide average of other counties, will allow -- if my memory serves me correctly -- about a seven-percent reduction in assessed valuation automatically. They can't exceed a given percentage of the statewide average. So any L.A. County property taxpayer is entitled to that sort of tax relief unless the Appeals Board anticipates that and arbitrarily increases to compensate for it. So you've got a probable reduction by filing the appeal anyway.

Then you've got the substantive reduction. One of the questions, I think, is going to be whether or not the files at the State Board of Equalization -- whether or not we might get access to those as a sister state agency to help us, because one of their jobs is looking at the assessment practices of various counties. If perchance this particular property has been selected by the division over there for their appraisal assessment analysis, we might have a fairly good factual case there. I don't know whether it is or is not one of those items, but if it would be, and that could be made public and used in the defense, it

might have a strong therapeutic effect to support our case that we're being overcharged.

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MR. THOMPSON: Actually, to take care of that particular part on the adjustment from the 25 percent to the 24 percent, I guess it is, we had to file also on the real property, although we had no real issue with the assessor on the real property. We had to file on the real property to get under that particular code.

What Mr. Cory is referring to here is in 1976 and '77 the Board of Equalization in their sampling appraised the Long Beach Unit. Their appraisal at that time is this broken green line here (indicating on a chart), whereas for the same year this (indicating) is the assessor's. So there actually was this difference last year in the assessment.

This year he then jumped the assessment over 40 percent up here (indicating). The appeal we filed is based on this assessed valuation right here (indicating), the difference between \$376 million and six hundred and --

CHAIRMAN CORY: Phil Watson's SB-90 property tax relief

MR. McCAUSLAND: Does the current law pending in Congress relate to this matter in any way in terms of future pricing?

MR. THOMPSON: This is one of the strange things.

The main difference of opinion we have with the assessor

is over the oil pricing that was used. This (holding up a different chart) actually is the oil pricing schedule that was used by the assessor. He assumed that prices would reach \$11.45 in about 1984. We don't know the basis for this. These (indicating) are the actual prices paid and the relationship to equalization tax. Actually, he would have said that this would have been income to the Unit, and if the tax goes through, it would be this red portion (indicating), so we would be taxed in effect on what would be going to the federal government.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Okay. Back to the Santa Monica Bay oil spill.

MR. NORTHROP: As the Commissioners are already aware, an estimated amount of 20 barrels of crude oil spilled ashore at Santa Monica south of the Santa Monica pier on Tuesday, September 20th. The oil was spilled from the Exxon tanker "Manhattan" while unloading crude oil consigned to Chevron, USA's El Segundo refinery. Chevror shipping representatives have reported that the ballast was accidentally pumped into the No. 6 starboard tank, either through a valve that should not have been opened or through a closed valve that leaked, thus overflowing the tank and causing oil to overflow from an open ullage port. The oil then ran over the top of the gunwale base and down the side

of the ship. Scuppers were plugged.

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Cleanup operations were conducted by contract crews under the direction of Chevron and the U. S. Coast Guard and paid for by Chevron. I personally inspected the beach on the afternoon of the 22nd. A few half-dollar size particles of seep oil remained on the beach. However, there was no oil that I could observe on the rocks or on the mussels that were attached to the rocks.

Chevron had notified the U. S. Coast Guard and the Department of Fish and Game of the time of the spill.

However, due to a failure in what was thought to be a fail-safe reporting system, the State Lands Division was not notified by either Chevron, as the state's lessee, or by the Office of Emergency Services Warning Center under the State Oil Spill Contingency Plan.

We have contacted the OES and clarified the nature of the Commission's interest and need to know. I am currently in the process of preparing a procedures letter to be addressed to all terminal operators on state and granted lands spelling out the Division's requirements with regard to spill reports.

As you will recall, the Commission held public fact-finding hearings on tanker and tanker terminal safety operations in Los Angeles and San Francisco last January. Subsequent to such hearings, a staff task force was

designated to develop any rules and regulations necessary to protect the environment and enhance the safe operation of marine terminals currently under lease arrangement with this Commission. The results of that staff effort are before you today.

I respectfully suggest that the Commission circulate

I respectfully suggest that the Commission circul the draft regulations to industry, environmental interests and the general public, and hold a public hearing or hearings to receive comments on such rules and regulations within 30 days of their circulation.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Is it appropriate to take action on that?

So move.

MR. NORTHROP: Yes, I think recognition of that --

MS. SMITH: Second.

MR. McCAUSLAND:

CHAIRMAN CORY: Without objection, such will be the order.

MR. NORTHROP: In closing, Mr. Chairman, items number 20 and C8 have been removed from the calendar.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Items 20 and C8. For anyone in the audience on those two items, they have been removed from the calendar: C8, I believe, at the request of the City of San Diego; is that right?

MR. NORTHROP: C8 at the request of Fish and Game, and 20 at the request of the City of Stockton.

1 Mr. Chairman, that completes my report. Thank you. 2 MR. McCAUSLAND: I've tried to find out through 3 direct inquiry whether or not it's true that today --4 CHAIRMAN CORY: It's out of order. We'll go on 5 to -б MR. NORTHROP: Mr. McCausland, it's my duty to 7 report that yea, verily, this is the Chairman's birthday. 8 MR. McCAUSLAND: It would seem appropriate perhaps 9 to join in a rousing --10 (Laughter.) 11 MR. McCAUSLAND: It's been some years since he's 12 had such an occasion. 13 MR. NORTHROP: Seeing as how we may not have 14 unanimity the rest of the day, I think it would be well 15 MR. McCAUSLAND: Who is good at --16 MR. NORTHROP: I understand that Commissioner 17 Smith has perfect pitch and could lead us. 18 MS. SMITH: I have laryngitis. 19 (Laughter.) 20 MR. McCAUSLAND: Isn't anybody going to start it? 21 CHAIRMAN CORY: No. We aren't going to sing. 22 (Laughter.) 23 CHAIRMAN CO : There's nothing to sing about 24 on this birthday. 25 MR. NORTHROP: Would the Chairman care to share

with the staff what this birthday means to you?

CHAIRMAN CORY: It means the loss of your job.

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN CORY: Moving right along, the report of the Assistant Executive Officer.

MR. GOLDEN: This is a report on the areas in which the State Lands Division concerns are interfacing with Coastal Commission and Bay Conservation and Development Commission matters.

The Bay Commission was petitioned by the city of Redwood City to engage in planning for a special area use plan for the areas within the city fronting the Bay. We made our concerns known relative to the fact that we have been engaged through the Bair Island Task Force in working out a land use plan for a large contiguous parcel, and that recommendations from that work should be coordinated with the city's special area planning. As a result, the chairman of the Bay Commission appointed Jim Trout of our staff to work on coordinating these efforts.

By agreement with the Coastal Commission staff, our staff has been furnishing maps of the coast delineating the most landward extent to which a claim of public trust lands might be made. These maps point out very plainly that they should not be used to indicate a public trust claim over any specific parcel. Such determination could

be made only after much more extensive research. There are several provisions of the Coastal Act dealing with public trust lands. For example, no categorical exemptions from permit controls may be given to any public trust lands.

Determining those lands subject to the public trust is in some instances difficult to accomplish. Once it is determined that certain lands are subject to the public trust, a determination as to what uses are consistent or inconsistent with the public trust must be made. It may well be that a number of uses are consistent with the trust, but giving priority to one type of use over another may be the most difficult decision.

Working closely with such police power agencies as the Coastal Commission, we can come to agreement as to which of competing uses may be best on any given site to meet the criteria of public trust concerns.

The State Coastal Commission staff has requested State Lands assistance in implementing public access portions of the Coastal Act. As part of their permitting activities, they've been requiring applicants to dedicate accessways to beach areas. In many of these instances, local units of government have been unwilling to take over these dedications because of maintenance and liability costs.

The Coastal Commission would still like to preserve

the option that if and when such local governments do wish to undertake such dedications, a record of those easements would be available. Thus they have asked us to record such offer of easements and take care of exercising and transferring such easements to responsible units of government when appropriate. Staff counsel is reviewing this proposal with the Attorney General's office to determine what additional liability if any such action would expose the State Lands Commission to.

That completes my report.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Okay. The next items that we have on the calendar are the consent calendar items. Those are items Cl through 7 and C9 through 18.

Is there anyone in the audience who has any problem with the suggested approval of any of those items?

If you have any, please step up now, because they will be approved rather quickly in one group.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Move their adoption.

MS. SMITH: Second.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Without objection, the consent calendar is approved as presented.

Item 19.

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, in June 1976 the existing contract expired for state-owned royalty gas to be sold by Chevron Oil Company -- then Standard Oil

Company of California -- from the Rio Vista, River Island and Ryer Island gas fields. Prior to its expiration, Chevron and Pacific Gas and Electric negotiated a sales agreement which set the price at \$1.20 per thousand cubic feet -- or mcf -- for approximately 96,000 mcf per day, of which 7500 -- eight percent -- per day constitutes the state royalty gas position.

Exercising its right under the master lease, the State Lands Commission refused to approve the \$1.20 price. At that time the Lands Commission felt in light of other information available the \$1.20 price was not consistent with gas prices being received by other producers in the state, and in fact was less than prices currently approved as the result of negotiations between other gas producers and PG&E.

Based on the arbitration-induced prices, the Commission instructed the staff to undertake an in-depth study to ascertain the true market value of California's royalty gas, and at the September 1976 Commission meeting approved \$1.20 as the interim price for a six-month period only, with the understanding that such approval would be for an interim period only, to be adjusted retroactively at the time the staff completed its survey.

Staff held a hearing on August the 11th, 1977, and evidence was presented by both industry, producers and

public utilities. In addition to that, the record was held open for an additional period of time for rebutting comments. This was to determine what the reasonable market value for northern California gas should be. In addition to the indepth study by staff, a consultant was retained who was thoroughly familiar with northern California gas pricing from the producers' standpoint.

As a result of this hearing, staff is recommending the following prices for gas: for the Rio Vista field, for the period of January to June 1977, \$1.75; from July to December in the Rio Vista field, \$1.91; and from January to June 1978, \$2.08. All of these are for million Btu or thousand cubic feet.

In the Isleton field, we are recommending \$1.62 for the period of January to June, 1977; July to December 1977, we're recommending \$1.77; and from January to June 1978 we're recommending \$1.93.

In the River Island field we're recommending \$1.75 for the period from January to June 1977; and in the period from July to December 1977 we're recommending \$1.91; and in the period from January to June 1978 we're recommending a price of \$2.08.

On the Ryer Island field, which is held in exchange with PG&E and Chevron, we're recommending in the primary period of January to June 1977 a price of \$2.05;

in the secondary period, July to December 1977, a \$2.31-per-mcf price; while in the final period of January to June 1978 we're recommending \$2.42.

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The staff has attempted in this study not only to take into consideration PG&E's prices, but has considered the free market wherever it exists in northern California. The testimony revealed that PG&E is charging Chevron \$2.29 for industrial gas at their Richmond refinery. Our consultant also advises us that Chevron recently has negotiated a contract to sell Spreckles Sugar Company gas for \$2.25 at the wellhead from the Crossroads Field near Sacramento. Spreckles, in addition, must lay all the necessary gathering lines to transport the gas to their manufacturing facility in the immediate area.

In light of the above examples, plus the national average for renegotiated gas sales contracts and probable LNG costs exceeding \$3, it is obvious that the prices indicated by the Lands Commission staff survey are indeed very reasonable.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Everitts and Mr. Willard and Mr. Lippitt are consulting and are available to answer questions by the Commission at this time.

CHAIRMAN CORY: What is the wish of the Commissioners? We have some people who wish to testify on this. Do you want to take that testimony first?

1 MS. SMITH: I would like to hear the testimony 2 first. 3 MR. McCAUSLAND: Yes. CHAIRMAN CORY: Okay. 1s Sylvia Siegel here? 5 MR. FALLIN: Mr. Chairman, my name is Jack Fallin. б I'm an attorney for Pacific Gas and Electric Company, I 7 think in the logic of people who may have statements on 8 this issue, it would make sense for us to speak first. CHAIRMAN CORY: Well --10 MS. SIEGEL: That's all right. 11 CHAIRMAN CORY: Mrs. Siegel asked permission 12 to speak first so she could get back to San Francisco. Does 13 that fit into your schedule? 14 MS. SIEGEL: I'll defer to Mr. Fallin. 15 CHAIRMAN CORY: Okay. 16 MR. FALLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it 17 will perhaps help everybody's understanding. 18 I have a written summary of what I will be saying 19 here today. 20 CHAIRMAN CORY: Is what you are going to say 21 today anything different from what was said at the hearing? 22 MR. FALLIN: It's probably quicker. It's much 23 It's primarily a summary of what's been said in 24 the hearing. A few items that have apparently appeared in 25 the record somehow after the hearing was closed, I'll address today too.

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CHAIRMAN CORY: Well, the record was kept open for 30 days to allow anybody to submit any information they wished.

MR. FALLIN: I think I received copies of all the information that was submitted, and there was at least one item mentioned this morning that was not in those materials.

Mr. Chairman, Miss Smith, Mr. McCausland, my name is Jack Fallin, Jr. I'm a lawyer for Pacific Gas and Electric. I have not appeared before this Commission before, although I did testify on PG&E's behalf before Mr. Northrop and members of your staff on this issue. PG&E's position, as placed before that staff, is summarized in the main and supplemental comments which are attached to these comments as Exhibits 1 and 2.

No one disputes the fact that \$1.20 per million Btu is the currently prevailing price for natural gas in northern California. The staff -- even the representative of the gas producers hired by the staff -- admit as much. PG&E has shown, and indeed the Standard Oil Company has confirmed, that those prevailing rates in fact are the result of hard and informed bargaining.

Contrary to what the staff would have this

Commission think, there have been competitive sales of

new gas supplies in California which, as described in PG&E's

testimony, fully support the \$1.20 level. Moreover, in the renegotiated contracts in which most of the prevailing \$1.20 prices were set, the sellers had the option of taking the matter to an arbitration where (quote) "reasonable market value" would be the standard. That of course is the same standard we're dealing with here.

The notion that this Commission can ignore the prevailing price in northern California -- based solely on the unsupported conclusion that PG&E's dominance makes use of that price unnecessary -- is false.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I'm glad you're cleaning up your language.

MR. FALLIN: The fact is that this Commission -- it's an art.

(Laughter.)

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MR. FALLIN: -- should act [sic] the role of the greedy landowner, grabbing everything he can get regardless of the evidence or the consequences. There is no such direction in the Constitution or in any other law of this state. On the contrary, the law of this state clearly establishes a policy directly contrary to the artificial device the staff would like to use in place of the prevailing price.

The device I'm speaking of is probably familiar to you by now. That is, you simply take a set of administered

nonmarket prices -- i.e., the prices set by the Federal Power Commission on the one hand, and the prices set by the Canadian government on the other hand -- push them together and come up with a figure, which you then call "market price".

CHAIRMAN CORY: I don't think that's what the staff did, sir.

MR. FALLIN: If they didn't, they didn't follow their consultant's recommendation. And the prices they came up with are only s'ightly below those levels,
Mr. Chairman. I have not seen an explanation of any other method from them.

CHAIRMAN CORY: It's a weighted average of three factors. Those are two of those three, and the other is the factor you solely want us to use.

MR. FALLIN: That's right. I think --

CHAIRMAN CORY: It's a compromise, and I think we ought to tidy up the record as to what it actually is.

MR. FALLIN: If in fact they added in the \$1.20, what that means is that there is one market figure in their formula. The only market figure they've used is the price in northern California, if I'm correct. The other two are regulated prices.

CHAIRMAN CORY: With you controlling the definition of "market", I'll consent to that.

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MR. FALLIN: Well, if there's a definition of "market" which includes prices set by government agencies -CHAIRMAN CORY: Well, there are market prices set by the renegotiated contracts of intrastate gas throughout the nation that were not included or could be included.

That's a market price.

MR. FALLIN: Well, from what I understand, though, that was a factor which apparently was thrown in as a way of looking at the results, but it was not a part of the formula used to reach those results.

CHAIRMAN CORY: True.

MR. FALLIN: In any event, the evidence before this Commission is undisputed that Canada's government-administered gas prices are directly linked to international crude oil prices. The mechanism is simple. The gas is converted to a Btu or heat value and then is tied to the price of international crude oil, prices set by the OPEC cartel. There is also no question but that OPEC, if operating in this state, would be illegal under both the federal antitrust laws and this state's Cartwright Act.

This Commission is charged with protection of the public interest, yet no consideration whatsoever has been given to the policy implications of importing administered prices set at cartelized levels by equating them with the standard of "reasonable market value".

The point may be made here that for heaven's sake, because PG&E is required to pay Canadian prices, they're already in California. The answer is: there is no choice. We're in the same position that the United States in general has been with respect to OPEC's international crude oil price. The law simply doesn't reach that far. But what we're talking about now is this Commission, under no compuls on, pulling those prices down into northern California.

The staff's calendar item report asserts -
CHAIRMAN CORY: Let me make sure I understand that

It's okay for your client to do it, because you can't control

it, but --

MR. FALLIN: To say that anything is okay because the victim can't control it is perhaps a curious turn of phrase.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I'm trying to understand your position. That's why I ask it. Turn it however you wish, sir, but I just want to delineate the issue you're trying to point out.

MR. FALLIN: The situation with respect to oil prices is simply one in which we've had no choice. I think a number of people have tried to see: well, isn't there some way we can protect ourselves against an international embargo and a combination of exporting countries? The

answer is: no, it's physically impossible. The law simply cannot reach that far, much though we may want it to.

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The same is true with respect to Canada. Canada sets those prices and imposes them on gas that's in Canada. If we want and need the gas from Canada, we have to take those prices.

Our policy -- the policy of this nation and this state, which abhors the existence of a combination designed to allocate markets and set prices -- suffers, but unfortunately there's not much we can do about it.

The suggestion by the staff's retained consultant, and now by the staff, is that having once had that done to us involuntarily, this Commission -- a Commission charged with protecting the public interest -- should perform the same function. And this time the function will result in profits not flowing to OPEC, profits not flowing to Canada, but profits going to the oil companies. The evidence, as I say, on this issue -- on the manner in which these prices are set -- is undisputed.

Now the staff's report asserts the existence of an opinion by the Office of the State's Attorney General that administered prices can be used to set market value.

No explanation is given for this doctrine; no opinion by the Attorney General is provided; and more significantly, nothing is said as to any opinion concerning the basis on which

Canada's prices are administered. What I'm saying is that there's been no finding, no showing, no anything as to the policy implications of this action.

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As PG&E pointed out at the hearings, ignoring the policy consequences of using Canadian prices is only one way in which the staff's desire to increase revenues from this gas field ignores the public interest all public officials are pledged to protect.

When we come to the consequences of this action,

I think there's a point that's important to make. PG&E's

position is that the testimony and evidence, fairly considered, shows that the prevailing price in fact -- well,

on this part of it there's no question: the prevailing price

is the market price; it is the market value established in

the relevant market. The question then becomes whether

it's reasonable or not.

CHAIRMAN CORY: And what the relevant market is. That seems to be the real question.

MR. FALLIN: I guess if you want to somehow pretend that this gas isn't in California, that it's in Texas or Louisiana, that's a mental exercise that can be performed, but unfortunately it's not the case.

CHAIRMAN CORY: You're making the contention that Canadian gas isn't in California, and it seems to me it is. It seems to me there's relevance there.

MR. FALLIN: Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure what the argument is here. There's no question but that this gas is produced in a field in Rio Vista in California. The contract refers to the market for that gas produced in northern California. You want to talk about the market for Canadian gas, you have to go to Alberta or Saskatchewan. If you go to Alberta or Saskatchewan, you will find that high prices indeed are being paid, because the nadian government extracts them. What you will also find is the Canadian government is extracting nearly all the profit from those high prices for its own benefit. That's something that doesn't happen in northern California. prices we're talking about here go directly to enhance the return on capital of the oil companies and the gas companies that produce, and also -- we'll give you -- the small amount of revenue to the state involved in this case.

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The fact is -- which brings me again to the consequences -- the point I'm trying to make, however, is that we're not bringing up the consequences as a reason for making a wrong decision, as a policy reason or the law. We're bringing up the consequences to advise this Commission of what the results are of going the wrong way. That's a distinction which I think is very important. It's not an attempt to club reason with results. Rather, it's an effort to indicate where reason goes and

where the consequences lead.

The inference that there is some overarching constitutional problem with accepting the prevailing price set in the relevant market, we think has to be completely wrong. For one thing, you've got to keep in mind that for the past however many years that this Commission has been in operation with respect to this particular field, this Commission has accepted as reasonable market value the prevailing prices in northern California set in exactly the same way they are today: 35 cents in '71, 42 cents in '73, 45 cents in '74, and 75 cents in '75, set in exactly the same way the \$1.20 price was reached.

The argument that because PG&E is big something has changed, is incredible. The market is exactly the same as it was when the definition was written into that easement. The market is exactly the same as it was when each and every one of those prevailing prices was accepted as a reasonable market value. In fact, if anything has changed, the level of competition has increased.

PG&E is here. There's no question about it. PG&E is a large purchaser of gas in northern California. That was known to the oil companies when they came in and explored here. It perhaps is a disadvantage in some ways, because we are able to exert some reasonable control over these prices. It was also an advantage, because PG&E's size and

capacity allowed us to take that gas on a very rapid basis, to build the lines in and market it quickly, providing the kind of cash flow that got most of these operations under way. Over the history of this development in California, California's average gas prices have almost always -- and today it is still true -- the average gas prices have exceeded the average gas prices nationwide.

I think the gas producers would like to make PG&E disappear. But it's a part of the market. It's as much a part of the market as a range of mountains or any other physical characteristic.

The fact is that no one -- well, save only those gas producers who hope to profit by this Commission's action -- can complain that a price set by reference to the prevailing rate in the northern California market is somehow unconstitutional, especially the way that rate has been accepted by the vast majority of gas-producing corporations with the option of having that rate set by arbitration at reasonable market value. In this case, one producer -- Standard Oil -- has specifically testified that \$1.20 was reasonable market value.

Not one iota of evidence has been produced that any gas producer in California -- including the state -- has an inadequate return under the prevailing price. In other words, there's been no evidence whatsoever that the

market value is unreasonable in terms of what the producer is making from it. Of course not. There is no such evidence. Certainly if there was any such, the representative of the producers, who served as consultant to the staff, would have produced it.

The fact is that if this Commission approves the use of the arbitrary border price formula, albeit salted with one small element of market price -- in other words, what they apparently would do would be to throw in the prevailing price after already having reached the levels obtainable by springing on FPC and Canadian prices -- it will have an impact on the consuming public far beyond the amount of money to be paid directly to the state from this field.

Mr. Lippitt has already testified for gas-producing companies in arbitration proceedings last year which resulted in significant price increases. He is expected to testify in arbitration proceedings now pending between PG&E and Texaco, and others. Let there be no doubt about this: he will carry the number he obtains here directly into combat for the producers he represents.

PG&E -- I -- will maintain that a Commission order approving Mr. Lippitt's number is wrong, as it will be. There's no doubt about that. There's no inference that we're going to, on some kind of a voluntary basis, go and spread this number around. However, we will be faced with a decision

made by an agency of the State of California, seeming to speak for all of its citizens, that this enormous price increase is somehow justified. You can all imagine the difficulty in arguing that use of Canada's oil-linked prices are contrary to public policy, in the face of a State Lands Commission decision adopting that very mechanism.

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If this strategy works in those pending arbitrations, the northern California consumers could be hit to the tune of some \$22 million over the period through June 1978.

I think the staff report indicates something on the order of an increased \$2 million return to the state under their proposed price schedules.

A recent press release seeks to intimate that this is a situation where PG&E seeks to gain some special advantage. As the staff well knows, it is the ratepayers who pay for increases in the cost of gas purchased by PG&E. I think that's something that has to be noted here. It may be some people don't follow what I'm saying. In other words, because the cost of purchased gas is passed directly through to the consumer, PG&E is not following some selfish motive in coming before you, and following some selfish interest which is going to increase its profit levels. Attempting to somehow set the ratepayers against us in this case simply won't work.

The story doesn't end at the \$22 million which
Mr. Lippitt, I suppose, hopes to obtain in the arbitrations.

Next July nearly all of PG&E's California contracts will have to be renegotiated. These same price levels, presumably inflated by some factor, will again be used in negotiations and any ensuing arbitrations. If the strategy works, the consequences would be a new price level based on the staff's figures, at a cost to the consuming public of something on the order of \$90 million.

Reference has been made in this proceeding to various new gas prices. I would just interject for a moment: the staff raised something which I was surprised to hear them raise, this supposed \$2.25 price for Spreckles Sugar.

PG&E has difficulty obtaining price figures. For one thing, it has to be careful from whom it seeks price information, because of those same antitrust laws that I referred to before. I do not know where the staff obtained this number. It seems rather curious that pricing levels are being exchanged, and this Commission is apparently becoming a vehicle for broadcasting it.

However, I don't know what precisely that number should be. I do know that number is wrong. I don't know how much lower it is. I do know that in fact Spreckles is a landowner in that situation. It gets one-sixth, or whatever the royalty position is. I don't know the amount. It gets a substantial portion of that gas back free of charge.

What I'm saying is that this latter-day incident, which cropped up for the first time in this press release, or whatever it was that came out at the beginning of this week, is a red herring, based on facts -- I don't know the exact details, but I do know that the details given are wrong.

CHAIRMAN CORY: How do you come to that conclusion? That's really a very arrogant statement.

MR. FALLIN: That those numbers are wrong?

CHAIRMAN CORY: That those numbers are wrong, yet you don't know what they are, but you know they're wrong.

MR. FALLIN: Well --

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CHAIRMAN CORY: I have trouble leaving that in the record that way, because when I asked the question of the people of Chevron, they did not deny those figures. They took exception to them, saying it was an exception to the rule, not that the figures were wrong.

MR. FALLIN: The people at Chevron, your Monor -Mr. Chairman, are in a somewhat difficult position. As I
understand it, they have some confidentiality problems with
their deal with Spreckles, so they find it difficult to
come out and put a specific price level on it. But they have
informed me that although they're not free to indicate the
exact price levels, the level given by the staff is not
correct. They have also informed me that there are arrangements

and I think this is known also to the staff -- between Opreckles and Chevron which make this contract very atypical.

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CHAIRMAN CORY: I think the statement that it is atypical is perhaps a valid statement, but to say that you don't know the facts but you know the staff's version of the facts are wrong, is somewhat --

MR. FALLIN: I might perhaps turn around, Mr. Chairman, and ask the staff exactly from whom they obtained the information that this price level was at \$2.25 without provoking an exchange of price information between gas producers.

CHAIRMAN CORY: You can ask, but get on with your testimony.

MR. FALLIN: Mr. Northrop can reply to that, where the information came from.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Go ahead with your testimony.

MR. FALLIN: By the way, you asked earlier if there was anything new. I don't believe there is anything about this ir the transcript of the hearing. I believe that this item here (indicating) came out after the time had closed within which supplemental comments were filed.

Reference has also been made to new gas prices.

Price levels for new gas discoveries which directly encourage the development of new gas supplies bear little or no relationship to the issue in this case. Again, you might

note that this price we've just talked about is for a new gas supply. You might also note that the only evidence in the hearing with respect to new gas supplies in California is that in areas where PG&E directly competes with Dow Chemical Corporation for new gas supplies, the price levels support the \$1.20 prevailing level.

The state's Rio Vista gas is not a new gas supply, nor is any of the gas scheduled for arbitration or renegotiation in the next year. There is no guarantee whatsoever that money paid for this gas, long since discovered, will ever be devoted to increasing this state's gas supplies.

I might add that if there was such a guarantee available, it could have been provided by the producers who seek this result.

MS. SMITH: I have one question. First of all,
I'd like to understand better how you reach the figures of
the impact on the consumer from these price increases.

MR. FALLIN: Okay. What we did was take the price levels that were listed, I think, either in the agenda item or in this press release, converted them against our existing volumes of purchase, first from the people who were involved in the arbitrations, and simply take the volumes of purchases, apply those prices to them, and come up with a number. With respect to the contracts that are coming up for renegotiation, basically the same process: we take our overall volume of

purchase from those people, apply those numbers to them, and gave you the results in dollar figures.

Now obviously this is an extreme case, and I don't want anybody to have any confusion about the fact that I'm going to argue like crazy that this staff position is wrong, if it's ever adopted. But this is in fact the result that we'll obtain if Mr. Lippitt carries the number that he got into this case into those other situations.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Sid, do you want to follow up on that?

MR. McCAUSLAND: On that same line of questioning, on your September 29th statement, this morning, at page 5, you cite a \$22 million cost to the consumers of California with a ceiling of perhaps \$90 million. On page 11 of your August 11th statement, you speak of \$18 million and \$40 million. It's clear that you must be using different sets of premises in the two different places. On your August 11th statement, I guess you're using the price of \$1.34.

MR. FALLIN: Yes. In other words, initially, frankly we thought that using the most unreasonable number we might be able to come up with, the Commission might go as high as \$1.50, which would yield \$40 million in result.

Mr. Lippitt frankly surprised us and sought to drive the number up so high that we had to come back with a new set of numbers, which I think were even higher than \$90 million.

When the staff was so gracious as to salt its regulated prices with the California market prices, that in turn adjusted the number to the figure you have in this final statement. That's the sequence of numbers that we presented.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Let me address the final statement, then, if I could. In your statement of this morning, you say, "If this strategy works in those pending arbitrations"

-- I assume that strategy is the \$1.90? \$2.10?

MR. FALLIN: It's the sequence that's presented in --

MR. McCAUSLAND: Okay. The sequence presented.

"If this strategy works, it could be hit to the tune of some \$22 million over the period through June '78." Later you say this \$22 million is not the end of the story. Dot, dot, dot. "The consequences would be a new price level based on the staff's figures at a cost to the consuming public of something on the order of \$90 million."

Is there a time frame associated with the \$90 million?

MR. FALLIN: That's an annual increase.

MR. McCAUSLAND: So each subsequent 12-month period

MR. FALLIN: Assuming that this artificial increment is added on, it would continue at roughly that rate into the future.

The two numbers are roughly additive, at least on a historical basis. You can actually say that having already

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expended the \$22 million, you'll be expending another \$90 million. I say "roughly": because of a continuance of those arbitrations beyond this second figure, you have to discount it slightly. So we did not put in the additive figure, which would be—whatever it is: \$110 million. We kept them separate.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Betty Jo?

MS. SMITH: Yes. Is the subject of your testimony, or the crux of it, that the Commission took factors into consideration in determining the reasonable market value which are illegal to take into consideration? Or are you just saying that as a matter of policy there are certain factors which we should not include in reaching the price of a reasonable market value?

MR. FALLIN: I'll try to answer that accurately.

I have a sort of a characteristic reluctance to call the actions of this staff illegal. Parenthetically, I might say that they were perhaps fulfilling their normal role in this, which is acting as would the staff of any gas-producing company or outfit to try to reach the highest price they could.

What I'm saying is that the use of Canada's cartelized prices is clearly contrary to the public policy of this state and this nation, because it includes those cartelized prices. I cannot answer for you here whether it is also

illegal: i.e., if somebody through a contractual arrangement compelled or agreed to use that precise formula which in turn was set by a cartel, whether that would be illegal or not. In other words, it's the fact that what you're doing is taking a price that you know to be set in a market that would be illegal in this country, and you're bringing it into this country not under any compulsion, but to pervert it as far as you can under a standard which says "reasonable market value". (a) It's not a market price. (b) How can you call a price set by cartel "reasonable"?

CHAIRMAN CORY: Mr. Fallin, where I have trouble and reject that whole argument as having any validity for PG&E to submit is that when you go before the PUC, you take those same prices, when you choose to buy Canadian gas instead of buying more California gas, and say, "Give us higher rates, and you stick it in the consumer's ear," and you do it.

MR. FALLIN: Again you're back to the point where the ratepayer really has a complaint with us as opposed to this staff position. The answer is: we go before the Commission and say, "It is reasonable for us, forced with this conclusion by government fiat, to pay it." What we're saying to you is that it is not reasonable to do the same thing here.

CHAIRMAN CORY: You have an option in terms of your

mix of gas -- your client does. Your client chooses to use 1 California gas for peak load only, and chooses not to use it 2 for full utilization. 3 MR. FALLIN: Two things --4 CHAIRMAN CORY: And you're in essence using your 5 б cheaper supply of gas -- your domestic California gas: Ryer 7 Island, Rio Vista gas -- for peak load, not for full utilization; and you're taking Canadian gas constantly. 8 MR. FALLIN: First comment: PG&E doesn't get Ryer 9 That's an exchange arrangement. That's Standard 10 Island gas. 11 Oil's gas. CHAIRMAN CORY: River Island. Pardon me. 12 MR. FALLIN: Second, we do not use California gas 13 only on peak. That's wrong. We do use it for a lot of 14 15 peaking purposes --CHAIRMAN CORY: These particular contracts --16 MR. FALLIN: -- are not used only on peaking at 17 18 They are used more heavily on peaking, but it's not at all accurate to say they're used only for peaking. 19 think the staff will agree with that statement. To carry it 20 21 still further --CHAIRMAN CORY: Let's go to your alternate fuel 22 23 sources. MR. FALLIN: I would like to finish answering your 24 first question. We have been directed by the California 25

Public Utilities Commission to husband supplies of California gas for the very reason you're talking about, for the same reason the government talks about husbanding supplies of domestic crude oil: in an attempt to defend those supplies against the fact that they're controlled from without. It's just simply that true. The Commission has told us to husband California gas.

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Now that brings up a very interesting point. The staff throws up another high number in our faces, and says, "Well, gee, industrial customers pay \$2.29 for gas from PG&E." The staff well knows -- Mr. Lippitt knows it perhaps better than the rest of them do -- that PG&E's rates have been skewed for policy reasons. We now have a lifeline arrangement, which means that for the lowest levels of residential gas customers, we're serving gas at essentially no return at all -- in fact, at a return which is close to if not below our average cost of purchased gas: in other words, an absolute loss.

In turn industrial customers are paying a much higher level. That's true. Putting that number in front of you and in front of the public can't be described in any other way but as deceptive.

But to carry the point a little further, the fact that PG&E has been directed to husband this gas for the California residential customer raises the point that in a

very real sense this gas, the state's gas from Rio Vista, has been dedicated to those residential customers at those rates which currently recover us an absolute loss. If you want to use that system to price this Rio Vista gas, you're going to end up coming out below \$1.20, because if you want to provide the cost of taking it to those residential customers and provide a rate of return on the facilities involved and back it up to a price, it's going to come out below \$1.20.

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That's a little bit of a long run. I think it's followable, however.

MS. SMITH: On what basis or how did you determine that the staff's method of calculating the reasonable market value is against public policy?

MR. FALLIN: Okay. Essentially that is, I guess, what you would call a matter of law as opposed to strictly a matter of fact. We know the method used. The method used was testified to by Mr. Lippitt before the staff, and Mr. Cory has confirmed the method used. It is to include those Canadian prices which have no relationship to the standard you're using, which says "market value". They're not set in any market. That's a contractual question, or a question that we all can deal with.

The second question is: how are those prices determined? It's our contention that those prices are

determined in a way that makes their use in California without compulsion contrary to public policy.

MS. SMITH: What is the public policy?

MR. FALLIN: The public policy is that contained in the laws of this nation and the state which indicate that any combination of producers or sellers, or any other instrumentality which exists for the sole purpose of setting prices and allocating markets, which is what OPEC is, is disfavored.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I think, to tidy up the record, public policy provides that having the capacity to do that is against public policy, whether or not you combine for the sole purpose. If you combine for another purpose and you incidentally do that, that would still be against public policy.

MR. FALLIN: But you sure make it a heck of a lot simpler when you sit down and write up in your agreement that you're there to set prices and allocate markets, which I think we can agree is what OPEC does. The proof before this Commission is --

CHAIRMAN CORY: No question. I just wanted -in case someone else picked up this transcript, I did not
want them to think that the public policy of this state and
this nation was that you had to enter into that agreement
for that specific purpose. I think the public policy is

relatively clear --

MR. FALLIN: What you're saying --

CHAIRMAN CORY: -- that price-fixing is against public policy.

MS. SMTTH: What's his position?

CHAIRMAN CORY: That Canadian gas should be excluded because it's a result of price-fixing, and that is an illegal combination if it had taken place here. Therefore we should exclude that price, since that's how the Canadians indirectly arrived at their price.

MR. FALLIN: I think I can with caution agree with that. That's exactly what we're saying. Perhaps more importantly for the purpose of this hearing, you'll note that in the staff report there's no finding at all on this issue. There's no finding at all that public policy favors or disfavors or does anything else with respect to this kind of an arrangement.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I think it is implicit in the findings that there is a dispute, trying to put a focus on it, as to what the market is. I think the staff has taken the position that the market is the sum total of the various sources of gas that PG&E acquires. They have, through their own devices, chosen to acquire -- for good or bad, because they had no other choice, or whatever -- they have chosen to get Canadian gas. Therefore, the staff has come to the

conclusion that that, as well as the artificially low prices of interstate gas, should be included in the mix in the same ratio through which PG&E has made a determination that they will meet California's gas needs by using fixed prices artificially low under Federal Power Commission interstate gas, and Canadian gas fixed prices artificially high with an OPEC base, and California source gas, using the three in the ratio to which they found them in the marketplace. That is the issue.

PG&E and Mr. Fallin would like to suggest that no, the only true market we should look at is California source gas --

MR. FALLIN: Well, I think that --

CHAIRMAN CORY: -- and exclude from that those that do not reach their \$1.20. We should exclude the arbitration figures which have been located, and we should exclude other abnormalities which they find in the market. I think that's the issue.

MR. FALLIN: I think there are at least two comments to that. One of them is that the definition of "market" is pretty simple: the place the gas is produced and sold is in California. It's true that gas is produced and sold in Canada. This is a point which --

CHAIRMAN CORY: Canadian gas is produced in Canada and sold in California, and you would like to exclude that

from the mix. 2 MR. FALLIN: But Mr. Commissioner, you're a seller 3 of gas in California. You're not a public utility. You're 4 not up in Canada or any place else. 5 CHAIRMAN CORY: But you as a public utility have 6 some right to go to Canada and buy that, and we have to 7 ignore that fact. That's what you're suggesting? 8 MR. FALLIN: There's no question about it that we 9 have to go to Canada to buy gas, and there's no question 10 that there is gas produced in Canada. Now let me carry 11 this a little further. I made this point --12 CHAIRMAN CORY: Is there any question that you are ìЗ buying Canadian gas at roughly \$2.15 per mcf and bringing 14 it into the California marketplace and selling it to the 15 consumer? Is there any question as to that? 16 MR. FALLIN: Not that I'm aware of. 17 CHAIRMAN CORY: But you believe that that is not 18 part of the market, am I correct? 19 MR. FALLIN: Perhaps if I could finish my earlier 20 statement. 21 CHAIRMAN CORY: Could you answer my question, sir? 22 MR. FALLIN: Well, I'm still trying to answer the 23 statement that you --24 CHAIRMAN CORY: I asked you a specific question 25 now. Can you answer it?

MR. FALLIN: The question you first --Ĩ CHAIRMAN CORY: No, the question I just asked you, 2 would you care to answer it or not? 3 MR. FALLIN: Well, I quess my answer to that 4 question is that I care to answer your earlier question first 5 and then perhaps --6 CHAIRMAN CORY: I would prefer to have it the other 7 8 way. MR. FALLIN: All right. There's no question but 9 that we are paying very high prices for Canadian gas, and 10 everybody knows the reason for that. The reason for that 11 is because the Canadian price is set that way. 12 CHAIRMAN CORY: And you bring that gas --13 The gas produced in Rio --MR. FALLIN: 14 CHAIRMAN CORY: Let me say --15 MR. FALLIN: I'd like to finish just one thing. 16 I would like to get a record CHAIRMAN CORY: No. 17 established for a purpose. We'll give you back the mike at 18 some point and let you make whatever speech you wish to make. 19 MR. FALLIN: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you make a 20 statement which I then can respond to. 21 CHAIRMAN CORY: No. I want to ask you some 22 questions. If you wish to respond, fine. If you choose not 23 to respond, that's fine too. Okay? 24 MR. FALLIN: My problem is, briefly, that I'd like

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to be able to respond fully rather than be cut off when I try to.

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CHAIRMAN CORY: I have some very specific questions which I'd like you to respond to. I think we have established that you agree that Canadian gas is purchased in Canada and brought to California and sold to the California consumer. That price is, I believe, somewhere in the neighborhood of \$2.15. Is that correct?

MR. FALLIN: I've said yes before, and I will agree to that again.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I'm trying --

MR. FALLIN: In fact, I think it's in our testimony CHAIRMAN CORY: I'm trying to get resolved down to what the real issue is. The next question is: I believe the point you're trying to make is that the Canadian gas should be excluded because it is not produced here, and that you would choose to define the term "marketplace" as being California gas produced in California, not gas consumed in California.

MR. FALLIN: Now may I answer that question?

CHAIRMAN CORY: Yes.

MR. FALLIN: All right. You will note that the issue of what the relevant market is, or what the market is, is a legal question, and you're dealing here in this easement with contractual interpretation.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Is this an easement?

MR. FALLIN: Yes, it is.

You will further note that the staff, the staff's attorneys, and Mr. Lippitt, who is also an attorney -- not one of them has ever produced before this staff, before any-body anywhere any case in this country which ever held that in interpreting the standard of market price or market value, it was valid to go outside of even the region in question, let alone the state, let alone the nation. That's a legal issue, and there's no question in my mind that the law is that the market is the region -- in this case, the state -- where the material is produced. Now that's on a legal basis. I'll carry that a little further also.

The fact is that this is a situation, if you want to put it that way, where PG&E exists in the California market. That, as I said earlier, poses some problems and some advantages for the gas producers. Right now I suppose they wish they were in Texas or Louisiana. Twenty years ago they were darn glad to be in California. The fact is we are here, and you can't make us disappear by imagining that this gas is produced -- you've got to remember that these are wellhead prices. The question is: what is the price at the wellhead?

You can go to Canada and ask the same question:
what is the wellhead price in Canada? You'll find it's

seemingly quite high. But you'll also find that nearly all of the fat, all of the return to the producer -- and in this case the state stands in the shoes of the producer -- is simply taxed away by the Canadian government. They do not see it. Now that is a major difference.

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I suppose the argument is: "Well, it's unfair that we're in California. We should be treated like we were in Texas, or we should be treated like we were in Canada." The fact is that they're making out better here in California than they would be in Canada under the taxing system that Canada uses. On an average basis -- now I'm using that term advisedly -- on an average basis -- that means all new gas, old gas, all the standards whatsoever -- on an average basis they're doing just as well as they are anywhere else in the country. That's because in Texas and Louisiana there are a lot of very low fixed-price contracts.

What I'm saying again is: now suddenly they wish they were someplace else. Maybe the state wishes it was someplace else. But you're not. The market is here. It's the same market that was here when this easement was drafted. It's the same market that was here when this Commission accepted payments based on exactly the same standard PC&E is urging before you today.

The other minor kind of thing which apparently the staff and perhaps you have skipped over is that the

Canadian price isn't a market price. The FPC price isn't a market price. Where on earth comes the justification for 2 cranking them into a market value determination? If you can find a case that says that, I'd be interested. 5 MS. SMITH: I'm assuming that you have found cases 6 that say that's impermissible? 7 MR. FALLIN: Well again, to tell you the truth --8 at one time somebody asked me that question, whether you 9 have authority for a given proposition. I was young enough then to say to the judge, "Your Honor, I don't think I have, 10 because I don't think anybody's been dumb enough to assert 11 it before." I don't think anybody has ever gone through the 12 mechanism of trying to use a price set by a foreign govern-13 14 ment, which is in turn linked to a cartel price --15 MS. SMITH: So there is no precedent on this issue. 16 MR. FALLIN: I don't think so. If you want to 17 put it that way, I think we're making new ground, yes. 18 CHAIRMAN CORY: Are you familiar with the Occidental 19 arbitration? 20 MR. FALLIN: Painfully. CHAIRMAN CORY: Did that use this mechanism? 21 22 MR. FALLIN: If you're asking me whether the 23 Occidental arbitrators came to the wrong result, the answer 24 is yes. 25 No. I want to know whether they CHAIRMAN CORY:

used the same mechanism.

MR. FALLIN: They did.

CHAIRMAN CORY: So there is court acceptance --

MR. FALLIN: No, there is no court acceptance.

As I suppose the lawyers in the room are well aware, arbitration is a peculiarly fiendish device when you attempt to appeal from it. The standards are extravagantly broad, which reach to the arbitrators making decisions on all sorts of facts. They can basically redefine their own jurisdiction in the process of determining it.

We did take it to the Superior Court in San Diego.

The judge did indicate that the issues raised by this

mechanism posed things that he thought should be addressed

by the Legislature. But under the strictures of the arbitration mechanism, he didn't think he could reach it. That's

where we got.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Unfortunately, that's basically where I get. I've got somewhat the same problems philosophically, but I come down about where the judge did having read that.

MR. FALLIN: What he's saying -- you know the way appellate courts say these things. The decision may even go so far as to say the decision was probably wrong, but because of the mechanism in which it occurred, I can't do anything about it. What you're saying is: the decision is

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CHAIRMAN CORY: I didn't say that.

problems with the mechanism but I don't see a better solution

to the problem.

Why is that? MK. FALLIN:

CHAIRMAN CORY: I just don't see a better solution.

MR. FALLIN: Well, the better solution, I would

prevailing price in northern California reached between PG&E suggest, is to take a small, lingering look at the actual

and such helpless entities as Standard, Shell, et cetera.

Tell me, sir: is Standard Oil a CHYIBWAN CORY:

uef das consumer or purchaser?

-- Yedt that they --NR. FALLIN:

CHAIRMAN CORY: Because if you're going to develop

Standard Oil as an arm's-length transaction, I think it's

important to put on the record winether or not Standard Oil

sells you more gas or buys more gas from you. It's important

to know whether or not they really, in that particular

transaction, have an interest in keeping prices up or down.

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CHAIRMAN CORY:

-- the \$90 million purishment and MR. FALLIN:

MR. FALLIM: You mean whether they could see down

therefore took a lower price?

CHAIRMAN CORY: No, no. Whether or not they are in fact purchasing more gas from you than they are producing in the market. Do they buy more gas from you than they sell you?

MR. FALLIN: Because of the fact that gas of course is used in the refining process hearily, I would say there's a good chance they do, sure. But I'm not sure how that at all affects their desire to get as much — they don't have any public interest strictures, as this Commission I hope does. For them it's simply a question of getting as much as they can for a sale of gas. If you are suggesting that Standard somehow throws in the towel in sales of gas because it has to pay a gas bill, that might be a profoundly enlightened view, but it certainly doesn't occur. You can ask them whether it occurs. You can ask them whether it occurs. You can ask them they think they threw this price to us. I think they've already been asked, and answered "No."

In fact, they raised the point, which the staff has never mentioned -- in fact, it gets down to price levels which the staff apparently doesn't even want to consider: i.e., the prevailing price -- they brought up the point that at Rio Vista PG&E does something unusual. At Rio Vista PG&I, provides a compression service for the gas produced. We don't do that for the gas that was involved in the Occidental arbitration. Standard's testimony indicates that if you

accurately value the compression service provided by PG&E, the \$1.20 price for Rio Vista gas is closely equatable with that Occidental arbitration result. That's their testimony, and I don't see anybody who's mentioned that here today.

CHAIRMAN CORY: There is an argument as to what we should accept as the market. I think PG&E and Mr. Fallin are saying the only market available to us is California-produced gas. The staff and, I'm afraid -- as I look at the arbitration -- the arbitrators -- and the court upheld that arbitration -- used the market defined as the mix of all the sources of gas. That's what I was trying to get at with Mr. Fallin. That's the fundamental issue: defining the market.

MR. FALLIN: Another quick comment: as I mentioned the advantages and disadvantages for the producers of PG&E's size, there are advantages and disadvantages in arbitration. It's true, as we found to our regret, that it's virtually impossible to overturn one of those things. It's also true that an arbitration is no. 'ng more than a fact-finding by three men, and has no precedential value when turned around and attempted to be used in the next forum. That's kind of the other side of the problem. All that happens is: three guys happened to reach that result.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Why is it that if these three

people decide something, all these horrendous \$90 million costs are going to accrue, and when those other three people in Occidental can get their money for their land, we can't come to the same conclusion in getting money for the --

MR. FALLIN: Okay. Well first of all, let's establish the range we're operating in. If you're really saying you want to get the Occidental price, you're talking about \$1.35. You're not talking any \$1.75 or \$2.08 or any of these other astronomical sums.

Second, if you are really talking about the Occidental arbitration result, you cannot ignore Standard Oil's testimony that the value of the compression services provided to you amounts to something on the order of 15 cents. If you're going to do that, all right.

Let me say something further. I'm still not saying that you're accepting the right price. (a) I think that their use of this Canadian mechanism was wholly wrong, and I'll argue that again, and I think I've got a darn good chance of winning unless this Commission comes out and says that that's a valid way of doing things. (b) The other part of that d cision was based on a high contract we had with Union Oil Company for their Union Island field. That again was a unique contract. It involved ten years' worth of extra peaking insurance beyond the basic term of the contract, and a number of other factors, which we argued

but they didn't believe it, and they said, "Well, that's okay."

I think the simplest proof of the fact that that was a unique contract is -- Union turned around and took \$1.20 for all of its other supplies. Those are things that have changed since the arbitration.

Let's get one thing straight. If you are really talking about looking at that as arbitration, those are the factors you consider. You consider: what was the price? What's the value of the compression services at Rio Vista? Also, was the arbitration right or wrong? If you take the facts as we know them now, I think the answer is probably —for me it's "certainly"; for you it's "probably" — it was wrong and too high at the time.

CHAIRMAN CORY: The arbitration was appealed to just Superior Court?

MR. FALLIN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CORY: And the court refused jurisdiction, or --

MR. FALLIN: The court said that the issues raised, in its opinion, given the problems with overturning any arbitration award, didn't give it enough room to do it. Its point was that within the arbitration mechanism they raise issues that the Legislature should perhaps -- in other words, the Legislature could pass a law that says: in arbitrations involving gas purchases, hold on a minute. You're going to

be able to relook at some of these facts. But that's not the situation we have here.

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Another point I think we should bring out: the burden in this proceeding has to be on the staff's position, because what you start out with is a given. You know what the prevailing price is. If you want to talk about precedent, you know the price that this Commission has accepted time and time again in the past. Now the burden then is: well, is that prevailing price, which is set in a market which we know all about, is that unreasonable? You've got a market value. Is it unreasonable? Is there any proof in this record that any gas producer is hurting in California, that that value is an unreasonable value?

CHAIRMAN CORY: Is that the question of reasonableness which is a standard that the PUC needs to deal with,
or is the question of reasonableness the question of the
marketplace: what an informed buyer and an informed seller
in the marketplace would sell gas for.

MR. FALLIN: Well, I think the answer to that is:
you've got the first. You've got the market. You've got
the value that the market gives you. The question then is --

CHAIRMAN CORY: We don't have a market --

MR. FALLIN: -- is that value unreasonable?

CHAIRMAN CORY: No. We have a difference of

opinion as to what the market is. You believe it to be

California-produced gas, and the arbitrators, the Superior Court apparently agreeing and the staff agreeing, saying: no, the market is the combination of California-produced gas, imported interstate gas and Canadian imported gas. There's an argument between us as to what the marketplace is.

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MR. FALLIN: I keep saying that the argument goes beyond that simplistic formula, because it's not just: how big is the market. It's also the fact that if you're going to define market value, there's one thing that's absolutely crystal clear: you've got to use market prices. And if there's one thing that's just as absolutely crystal clear, it is that the Canadian price isn't a market price under anybody's conception of any possible definition.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I think the federal government and the FEA have taken the world market price set by OPEC as market price, so your bald statement that it is obviously apparent that it can't be is somewhat disproven.

MR. FALLIN: Now wait a minute.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Reasonable men can differ.

MR. FALLIN: You've just switched terms. I don't think anybody has suggested that you go directly to OPEC and ask them to write the price. So far the request is that you use the Canadian price. I said there is no question but that Canada's price is set by regulation; it's not set in the market. Now if there's a disagreement with that, I'd like

1 to respond to it. 2 CHAIRMAN CORY: I will accept that, but the cartel mechanism gets in where there is a public policy question 3 based upon the Btu equivalent. 4 5 MR. FALLIN: There's no question that we've had to live with international crude oil prices, and I think 6 everybody in this room knows the cruel consequences of that 7 fact. We're only really beginning to come out from under 8 it now. CHAIRMAN CORY: I'm not so sure we're coming out. 10 MR. FALLIN: I'm not arguing that that's over or 11 they're going to disappear, or anything else. What I'm 12 saying is: for heaven's sake, don't use a standard which 13 says directly the opposite of reasonable market value to 14 import that kind of a philosophy into this state. 15 I think there are other --16 CHAIRMAN CORY: A question for the Attorney General 17 does the contract use the term "reasonable" or just the term 18 "market value"? 19 20 MR. STEVENS: Jan Stevens, Attorney General's office. 21 Mr. Chairman, I believe the criterion is, as 22 Mr. Fallin indicated, "market value". 23

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value".

CHAIRMAN CORY: As opposed to "reasonable market

MR. STEVENS: Reference was made to advice from our office. There is no formal opinion in this respect, but we have advised the fact that the Commission has the discretion to consider the market as it finds it, and not a hypothetical free market, that it's proper for the staff to consider regulated prices as well as other prices when it determines what the market constitutes for this purpose.

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MR. FALLIN: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to point out a significant thing that was just said. What Mr. Stevens just said is that this Commission is not required to look at some hypothetical free market, but should look at the actual market. That is what the law says, and it's what

CHAIRMAN CORY: Are you rough, Mr. Fallin?

we've cited in our briefs. What that means for this Commission is: you can't go and pretend that this gas isn't produced in northern California and that PG&E isn't there. You can't run away from those real facts based on -- I am not kidding when I say -- a one-sentence conclusion that it's not ideal or it's not free, or anything else. It's where it is.

The other question is: all right, you have to look at the real market. You have to look at the \$1.20. That's the prevailing price. The burden is on somebody else to say there's something else around that indicates that's wrong.

My next step is to say -- at this point I think we part company -- I don't see how you can call Canada's price a

1 market price. 2 I think that concludes my comments. 3 CHAIRMAN CORY: Mrs. Siegel. 4 MS. SIEGEL: Mr. Chairman, Miss Smith, 5 Mr. Commissioner, thank you. My name is Sylvia Siegel. 6 Executive Director of Toward Utility Rate Normalization, 7 T.U.R.N. for short, a public interest group based in San Francisco that represents consumers before the Public 8 Utilities Commission, the Energy Commission, generally in 9 opposition to PG&E -- or I would say always in opposition to 10 11 PG&E on rate applications -- and here I find myself on the same side of the table, not only in support of PG&E, but 12 wishing I could afford to hire Mr. Fallin for our staff. 13 14 (Laughter.) 15 MS. SIEGEL: I probably ought to bite my tonque. 16 MR. FALLIN: I hope that's not being taken down. 17 (Laughter.) 18 I can't afford it, Mr. Fallin, so relak. MS. SIEGEL: 19 I think he did a magnificent job of setting out 20 the issues, of analyzing the facts, of presenting you with 21 what should be considered in determining what constitutes 22 the royalty payment for gas under your supervision. 23 I have no prepared statement. Rather, I'm reacting to the press statement you made, Mr. Cory. 24 I must say I'm 25 a little puzzled. I'm also shocked. I'm shocked at the

consequences of what this decision if adopted would mean to 22 million California consumers, and I'm puzzled because I remember very well just three short years ago, Mr. Cory, you were a magnificent tiger taking after all the oil companies around the world, and here you are trying to side with them. That puzzles me.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I thought Standard Oil was for \$1.20; that's why I moved the other way.

(Laughter.)

MS. SIEGEL: I think the facts clearly indicate that the prevailing and market rate really is 1.20. I'm not going to put in any information about rates. I think the record has sufficient testimony on the question of rates.

I know that you must have some kind of ambivalence -- or I would hope you have some kind of ambivalence -- about this recommended decision in view of your constitutional mandate to protect the public interest. I would submit, ladies and gentlemen, that the constitutional mandate to protect the public interest goes to the public interest of 22 million citizens in California, and not the mere fact of trying to establish what's a reasonable royalty payment for gas under your supervision.

In consideration of that, I'm also surprised, Mr. Cory, why you did not get a competent economist to put testimony into this record, and relied instead on

Henry Lippitt, the potentate of the California fiefdom, to pursue his own self-interest in hiking the prices of California-produced gas. I find that shocking. I find that a conflict of interest. Then I find out that not only is Henry Lippitt permitted here to consult with you, but you're also paying him out of our tax dollars. That will never do, Mr. Cory.

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You know and I know there are a lot of competent energy economists around this country who could have testified. Turning it around --

CHAIRMAN CORY: Could you suggest a few?

MS. SIEGEL: I sure can. I can suggest John

Wilson in Washington, Dave Schwartz -- I'll give you a whole

list of names. Talk to Terry Goggin, and he'll give you

a list of names who testified in the record in that legislative proceeding.

However, you selected Henry Lippitt and paid our money for it. I assume you selected Henry Lippitt because you felt that information on California's market was the thing you had to consider. If that's the reason you selected Henry Lippitt, I might forgive you. I agree: that's what you have to consider.

I'm not a lawyer, so I'm not going to interpret
what the legal definition is of a market. But I think that
anybody examining the facts with respect to pricing California

gas would clearly conclude that the prevailing rate in the northern California gas market is in fact the market. The price paid for Canadian gas, for Mexican gas, for any other kind of gas is irrelevant.

As a matter of fact, you might want to know,
Mr. Cory, that with respect to the rate set by the Federal
Power Commission of \$1.46 per mcf, T.U.R.N., along with 19
other organizations across the country, has appealed that
FPC Opinion 770, not only to the U.S. District Court of
Appeals, but we are taking it to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In view of the Congressional debate, which incidentally I'm sure will go on for two or three weeks -- when I was in Washington last week, I know there was a line-up of a hundred amendments that don't begin to come up to the prices that were mentioned here in this record. But in view of that kind of political situation, I don't think there will be any quick settlement of the deregulation issue. That's important for your consideration, because the facts before you indicate that you could make a decision based on \$1.20 for the three periods included in your instructions.

Now I don't want to bad-mouth Henry Lippitt, but I guess I am. He's a nice fellow, and I'd like to see all the California companies buy more California gas. His testimony varies with the proceeding, so frankly, without having a chance to cross examine him, I can't rely on most

of the numbers that Henry Lippitt puts into this or any other record. If this kind of proceeding contemplates scrutiny of the evidence and allows for a period of cross examination, I'll be glad to come back another day to perform that function.

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But I think it's unnecessary. I think the facts are clear on the record that \$1.20, the prevailing market rate in northern California, is the rate that should be adopted by this Commission, or the consequences to the consuming public in California will be frightful. I will accept the figures of PG&E. Sometimes I do accept their figures. I've reviewed them. I think that's a pretty good estimate of what the consequences will be.

I think it's important when you determine what the market price is to not use the universe as your universe, but to use the proper universe, which in this instance is northern California, or at the most the state of California.

I think if you examine pricing for intrastate gas elsewhere -- I admit I've not done a great long study on it. It's my recollection, however, that intrastate pricing in other states is done on the basis of prices that exist within that state. If you look at prices that exist now for old gas, which is what we're talking about, you'll still find some 23-cent, 35-cent gas prevailing, and will for the duration of those contracts.

In conclusion, Commissioners, I think your duty goes beyond the very narrow duty of trying to establish what might be the benefit of the state of California as a landowner, to consider the effects on the population of this state. Now frankly, with the state treasury overflowing with money, I don't see why you're quibbling about a mere \$2 million, which is all you would get, where the cost translated to the consumer -- and make no mistake about it: it's the ratepayers of PG&E -- Mr. Fallin made a magnificent argument, but PG&E isn't going to pay it. I'm going to pay Three million ratepayers of PG&E are going to pay it. And three million ratepayers of Southern California Edison and Southern California Gas are going to pay it -- maybe not this month or in June, but you can be sure they're going to pay it when their gas contracts come up.

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So while I question whether PG&E does in fact engage in hard bargaining -- I'll tell you: since 1973 I've given John Sproul a very hard time on the stand. On this last round of negotiations for the current contract price under the same thorough scrutiny, I guess I was finally convinced that they did in fact engage in hard bargaining. As a matter of fact, we joined PG&E in appealing the arbitration award, even though we knew that might be a futile gesture, because everybody knows the courts never overturn an arbitration award. But I felt we had to do it.

Now: here I am testifying for PG&E. It's very hard --

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CHAIRMAN CORY: I share your discomfort. We find ourselves having strange allies at individual points.

MS. SIEGEL: All right. But damn my discomfort. I'm not going to pay a penny more than I have to pay. There are 22 million people in this state who are going to suffer the burden of this raunchy decision. I urge you to go back to the facts, to go back to what market economists would determine is the proper market, and consider \$1.20 the prevailing reasonable market value of the gas that you're concerned with.

Thank you, Mr. Cory. Thank you, Commissioners.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I'd like to try to frame one issue that I think is important, the one that I think is the crux of the dilemma that we have. We are granting a public resource, publicly owned gas. We did by a prior contract, a contract which, if I had been on the commission, I don't think I would have voted to allow us to enter into. But we entered into it some time ago, and now we have the job of administering that contract.

But we're talking about gas owned by 22 million people of California, yet the ultimate effect of all of those contracts is given to a few Californians.

MS. SIEGEL: Not so few. Three million isn't so

few.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Three million out of 22 million.

So one of our problems --

MS. SIEGEL: Three million households or customer accounts. Multiplied by four, that's 12 million. Two and a half million residential customers, and the rest commercial and industrial.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I would question that PG&E in terms of the total population of the state -- what? Sixty percent? Forty percent?

MS. SIEGEL: Whatever.

CHAIRMAN CORY: But it's part of the state, and the problem we get into, the real vexing dilemma we have, is either driving the highest possible price or giving the gas away. We could say: "Gee, the people would be better served if we just gave them the gas." If there weren't two middlemen -- Standard Oil and PG&E -- we'd be much better off if we just gave them the gas. I'd have no problem with that except that we're going to give two specific middlemen and their particular consumers that gas. That's where the problem comes in: whether the benefit does or does not flow to the non-PG&E Californians.

MS. SIEGEL: Mr. Cory, let me make two points. As I recollect, you were the fellow who put into the hopper a bill that would establish a state oil and gas company.

CHAIRMAN CORY: No. 1 MS. SIEGEL: Well, somebody did a couple of years ago, and the purpose of that was to establish a benchmark 3 4 for determining the cost, necause everybody knows that 5 pricing gas and oil should be related to the cost plus a 6 margin of profit, plus even a component for exploration and development. I would give them very generous allowances on that. In no way, if you used a cost-based formula, would 8 you even begin to arrive at \$1.20. Okay? The second question is that you're not just 10 11 talking about PG&E's customers. Let me remind you that this market is a state market and that you are affecting -- if 12 not this month, then six months from now -- the market for 13 southern California. 14 15 This is not a political issue. This is an economic issue. 16 CHAIRMAN CORY: But in terms of the economics --17 MS. SIEGEL: You're thinking of politics. I'm 18 I'm not a politician. 19 sorry. 20 CHAIRMAN CORY: No, I'm thinking of the economics. MS. SIEGEL: I'm thinking of my pocketbook and 21 2.2 that of every other consumer in this state. 23 CHAIRMAN CORY: It's a question of: if we gave

MS. SIECEL: You're not --

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the gas away for nothing --

1 CHAIRMAN CORY: If we came to the conclusion: let's 2 do it for ten cents --3 MS. SIEGEL: I don't believe in giving gas away 4 for nothing. I believe in getting the reasonable value of 5 the commodity. 6 CHAIRMAN CORY: That's what we seem to be trying 7 to struggle with. 8 MS. SIEGEL: It's no struggle. I think the facts 9 are clear. You don't have to struggle. Let me respectfully 10 suggest: the facts are there. There's no struggle. clear the rate should be \$1.20. That's the rate. 1.1 I don't know why you have to reach across the 12 13 border. I don't know why you have -- let me tell you: 14 there's gas going to come in from Chile, from Baja California; there's lots of gas in the Gulf of Mexico. Are you going 15 16 to wait and get the prices for that gas when that comes in 17 to determine what should prevail between now and June of 18 1782 19 That's already determined. It's predetermined. 20 Those contracts are in effect. The \$1.20 is there. Any rate higher than that will be subject to other action. We're 21 22 prepared to seek declaratory relief if a rate higher than 23 \$1.20 is adopted. 24 MR. McCAUSLAND: Mrs. Siegel's reputation precedes 25 her as a layman who has spent so much time in devotion to

this cause that she's developed an expertise that is respected by her adversaries.

I have a distinct problem. I received the board book yesterday. I read the two-page background about five times last night trying to get the heart of the issue before me, and it makes so little reference to the August 11th hearing that I feel compelled, before taking a vote on such a significant public policy issue, to spend a significant amount of time reviewing the published record of what took place in our August 11 hearing.

It's clear to me from the testimony that's being presented today that I do not understand enough about the relationship between the market issues in this particular instance to determine that the price schedule laid before me is substantiated by the facts.

MS. SIEGEL: Commissioner, I don't know if I'm permitted to respond.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Sure.

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MS. SIEGEL: I think there's a lot of obfuscation in this record. Really, I hate to simplify things, but to me it's a simple question of your market definition, and that's clear. In 1973, '74, '75, this Commission had traditionally considered northern California as the market. Any economist in this kind of a setting would consider northern California as the market. That's a simple statement

ì That's the record in this Commission. 2 MR. McCAUSLAND: I assume --MS. SIEGEL: All this nonsense about all these high 3 figures t rown around. Of course they are. Henry Lippitt 4 will get a big fat raise in fee or commission or whatever 5 it is he gets in gas, and we've had enough gas put into б 7 this record. 8 'Laughter.) 9 MS. SIEGEL: I think the facts are clear. 10 is it. 11 MR. McCAUSLAND: I'd like to come to that conclusion through my research just as you came to it through your 12 13 research. 14 CHAIRMAN CORY: Any other questions? 15 Thank you. 16 MS. SIEGEL: Thank you. 17 CHAIRMAN CORY: Other people have indicated they 18 want to speak. Mr. Radford of Shell? 19 MR. NORTHROP: The reporter needs to change paper. 20 CHAIRMAN CORY: Let's do that while we sit in 21 place, because we're running late. We've got the rest of the agenda to go through before we go to lunch. 22 23 (Thereupon a brief recess was taken.) 24 25

CHAIRMAN CORY: Mr. Radford.

MR. RADFORD: Mr. Chairman, my name is Earl Radford. I represent Shell Oil Company. Shell hasn't appeared in these hearings. Shell is a co-lessee with Standard-Chevron under the two state leases which are committed to the Ryer Island unit. For the record, the numbers of those leases are 3743.1 and 3896.1. I want to deal specifically with those leases.

I haven't looked at Standard Oil Company's leases. I don't know what they say. But I do know this discussion that's been going on in here has no reference at all to the Ryer Island leases. The terms of the leases aren't in discussion. So let's get back to the leases.

The specific terms of these leases establish the amount of money payable to the state for gas that's allocated to the leases under the provisions of the unit, the leases as amended by the unit which was joined by this Commission. These provisions are clear and without any ambiguity.

The lease provides that the state is to get sixteen and two-thirds percent of the current market price at the well and of any premium or bonus paid on all non-oil production -- and gas is a part of non-oil production -- that's either removed or sold from the land. That covers both removal and sale. The current market

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price at the well shall be determined by the state. In this case, this is your Commission. It shall not be less than the highest price in the nearest field in the state of California at which such non-oil production of like quality is being sold in substantial quantities.

Now that is the contract that exists between Shell and the state. You will note that that provision provides that payment for royalty on gas is to be computed solely on the basis of the current market price at the well, with a possibility of adjustment if similar gas is being produced in the nearest field to Ryer Island for a higher price. Now, "the current market price at the well" is a phrase of definite meaning. Nobody put into this thing the concept of "the reasonable market price". That isn't a part of this Ryer Island contract. It can't be written in at this stage. This is a price which an actual buyer is paying or is willing to pay at such point under existing conditions.

Now the state -- and that's this Commission -- is given a duty to determine the market price at the well, but this determination must be in good faith, based on the facts that exist. The state has presented no instance -- the state or its consultants -- of a buyer either in Rycr Island or elsewhere in the nearest field who is purchasing or even offering to purchase gas at prices in

excess of \$1.20. The only evidence or information in this matter pertaining to Ryer Island establishes \$1.20 as the present market price in that case, and that market price is the basis for royalty payments under the lease. The state and this Commission should now confirm such amount should be used until conditions in the actual market change.

The state consultant did not consider the clear provisions of the Ryer Island lease. He took off on a tangent. He gives his opinion on what a fair market value or a reasonable market value is. But he doesn't say: reasonable to whom? If I rent you an apartment as a landlord, I might think a reasonable rent is \$1,000, but as a tenant you might think a reasonable rent is \$200.

"Reasonable" is "reasonable to whom" at this stage.

Now whatever meanings these vague, subjective phrases have -- either fair market value or reasonable market value -- the point that I'm trying to make is that these expressions are not contained in the Ryer Island lease. They're just not in there. The consultant may have read such expressions in other leases at other times or perhaps in gas sales contracts, such as the one that was being arbitrated. That may have been an issue in that arbitration, but these phrases are not part of the Ryer Island lease.

This lease was written and submitted by the state.

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 This isn't the oil company lease that's being interpreted. This is a state lease that's being interpreted. In the interpretation, the constant action of the parties over the years has been to interpret it as to what is actually being paid in California.

Now the lease in this case is a contract between

Shell and the state. At this point new provisions cannot

be added to the lease without the consent of the lessees.

To strike out the word "market price" and put in "reasonable

market value" is a substantial amendment of the lease.

To do what you're practically asking in this, it's the

same effect in dollars as to strike out the royalty of

sixteen and two-thirds and put in thirty-three and a third.

The basic contract law requires consent, an agreement of the parties to amend leases. Besides that, the constitutional provisions which bind the state of California as a government entity prevent the impairment of the validity of contracts, which is, I think, what is being attempted here. I submit that under the existing circumstances you should confirm the \$1.20 is now the market price in the Ryer Island field, and that such sums should continue to be used as a basis for the royalty until the circumstances change.

I respectfully submit that the price of gas in

Alaska, which is referred to in the testimony, in Indonesia

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or Algeria or Canada, in midcontinent United States or eastern United States, has really no effect. Someday they may have an effect in California. Someday people in California might be dealing and arguing about those prices. But until that effect exists, the contract provides that the current market price at the well controls.

I also am amazed with the submission as the current market price at the well, which is what the lease provides, by the mental gymnastics that people go through to get the sales price by a regulated public utility to be even considered.

I thank you very much for listening to me go on.

I tried to get through before your time ran out.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Questions?

Thank you.

Mr. Leonard Snaider.

MR. SNAIDER: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, my name is Leonard Snaider. I'm a Deputy City Attorney, City and County of San Francisco. I'm here representing City Attorney Thomas O'Connor, City Attorney of San Francisco.

Our office is extremely active in public utilities rate matters. We are extremely concerned about the level of rates that will be set, and we have been and will continue to be extremely active in making sure that the consumers get natural gas at the lowest possible price.

What we must focus on here first are: who are the real parties in interest, and what is involved in this case. I read a press release that seemed to think that the real issue was a windfall to the gas wholesalers, versus \$2 million for the state of California. Those are not

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the real parties, and those are not the dollars involved.

What is involved here are the ratepayers of the

state of California, and the gas producers of the state of California. If this staff recommendation -- and I really even hesitate to call it a staff recommendation, because it is the recommendation of the California gas producers. It is a scandal, and I'll go into this aspect later, but it is a scandal that a state agency would have called upon the gas producers to be their expert consultant.

A question was asked by you, Mr. Cory: who could you have gotten? You could have started with a state agency that has some expertise. Now I respect the staff for getting a consultant, because they have no expertise in this matter. I respect them for getting a consultant. But you could have started with the Public Utilities Commission of the state of California, a sister agency that has expertise in gas matters. You could have looked to the Energy Commission. There are various places you could have gone. But you don't go to the gas producers.

Now what stake do the gas producers have in this?

You can be certain that the rate that you adopt, assuming it is the gas producers' advocated rate that your staff has willy-nilly adopted -- if you adopt that rate, the gas producers will use that rate to gain higher rates in the future for their other sales. So although you may get \$2 million for the state, other gas rates could go up as much as \$90 million a year.

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That's the benefit for PG&E -- excuse me. That's the benefit for the gas producers. Who pays it? Not PG&E. PG&E is a middleman in this. The ratepayers will pay it, and that's where the \$90 million will come from.

You've asked the question: "Well, shouldn't we consider the interests of all of California, versus just PG&E's ratepayers?" I submit that the interests will coincide, and the mere \$2 million that you may get by using your gas consultant's recommendation will be nothing compared to the cost to all Californians. PG&E is not alone. PG&E sells their gas sometimes to Southern California Gas in the past, sometimes to Edison. What you have done here might well be a precedent for the rest of the state.

There are certain questions of law that you probably should have asked. I have heard reference to an Attorney General's opinion -- not an opinion; the Attorney General was quite clear it was not an opinion, but just an informal comment. But you should ask the Attorney General: did you

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err in setting these rates in the past? Has the past method been illegal? He'll have to tell you it wasn't.

And it is that precise method that PG&E is advocating here.

I want to give you, as well as the dollar consequences, what will probably be the legal consequences if you adopt the gas consultant's report, although the gas consultant's report carries the name of a so-called staff report. There is going to be litigation. PG&E is going to have to challenge you. I'll tell you why they're going to have to challenge you. PG&E, to get rates from the ratepayers, has to show that they used best efforts to keep those gas rates low. So PG&E will of necessity challenge this determination, and boy, do they have grounds.

The so-called staff hearing, as I understand it, was little more than a kangaroo court. The staff consultant who had ex parte contact with the staff, was not even permitted to be cross examined by parties. The hiring of this consultant alone raises significant legal questions. You will be in court if you do this. I would assume that we will join PG&E. I would assume that the California Public Utilities Commission will join PG&E.

Let's assume though that these rates do go through and that the rates are passed on to the consumers. It will certainly be our recommendation that -- any surcharge for this staff-gas producer collusive rate will be passed on to the ratepayers, but we will specifically recommend to the California Public Utilities Commission that it be passed on in the form of a separately stated surcharge, and that that surcharge be called the Cory-Dymally-Bell Surcharge. The commission can do this. They put little notes on their bills for surcharges.

(Laughter.)

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MR. SNAIDER: We will also suggest to the commission and this commission is here explaining to you why you have an unreasonable rate. The commission can also suggest that a bill insert be sent to every ratepayer explaining why this massive windfall of \$90 million a year to the poor gas producers should be put in. This is the way this will go if you persist.

Frankly, I hope this isn't what you do. I hope you get down to the bottom of this and find out why this staff retained that consultant, because that is improper on its face. After you find that out, you should censure the staff, and should adopt the same rate-making method that was previously adopted, and which the Attorney General will tell you was a reasonable method in the past.

That completes my comments. Thank you very much.

MS. SMITH: I'm assuming you attended the August 11th hearing?

MR. SNAIDER: I did not, and I will tell you why I

did not. For the most part, the interests of the ratepayers in these matters are well protected by the California Public Utilities Commission, who did attend. And in this instance, PG&E has put in a good-faith, honest showing, and we knew this would happen. We were shocked when we found out that the staff, your staff, had retained Mr. Lippitt. We're used to Mr. Lippitt. He's always arguing for higher prices. And he's entitled to argue for higher prices for his client. He should be up here as an advocate, just as I'm up here as an advocate now, but not as a consultant to your staff.

MS. SMITH: Before you leave, I'd like to ask the staff: did anyone make a request to cross examine
Mr. Lippitt?

MR. NORTHROP: From the audience?

MS. SMITH: Any person who offered testimony.

MR. NORTHROP: I don't recall. They well may have.

MR. SNAIDER: Didn't PG&E? Do you remember that?

MR. NORTHROP: Miss Smith, we had a hearing, and the hearing concept was to lay the facts on the table. There was also a time -- as we mentioned earlier, they had 30 days to rebut any restimony given by anyone. That was available.

MS. SMITH: Was anyone allowed to ask questions of the expert?

١ MR. NORTHROP: I don't believe so. We did not 2 conduct that kind of an adversary proceeding. 3 MS. SMITH: You do not recall whether or not anybody asked --5 MR. NORTHROP: We did not conduct an adversary б proceeding. 7 MR. SNAIDER: Excuse me. Miss Smith, it's my understanding of what happened at the meeting that 8 Mr. Northrop specifically prohibited that. 10 MR. NORTHROP: That's correct. 11 MR. SNAIDER: The answer to your question is that Mr. Northrop specifically prohibited cross examination. 12 13 That's your due process in the kangaroo court that was held by Mr. Northrop. But these can be put on the record. 14 15 The Attorney General can advise you on the reasonableness of that type of procedure. 16 17 MR. NORTHROP: It also should be pointed out, 18 Miss Smith, that there was an Attorney General who approved the form of that meeting that we held. 19 MS. SMITH: Who was that? 20 MR. NORTHROP: Alan Hager from the Attorney General's 21 office made the opening statement, I believe, and instructed 22 staff on the methods of handling the hearing. 23 Procedurally, as far as I understand 24 MR. STEVENS:

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it, there were no denials of due process as indicated by

counsel. This type of hearing does not require cross examination, but it does require an opportunity for rebuttal, which I understand was provided.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Any further questions?

MR. SNAIDER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Mr. Way.

MR. WAY: Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, my name is Greville Way. I'm Chief Gas Engineer with the California Public Utilities Commission.

The California Public Utilities Commission did present two statements at the August 11th hearing. One statement was by the majority of the commission, and the other statement was by one of the commissioners. I think with everything that's been said, I'll just cut my statement short, and indicate that three of the five commissioners of the California Public Utilities Commission urged the State Lands Commission to adopt the \$1.20 per million Btu as the fair market value of gas in northern California.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Questions?

MS. SMITH: Have you studied the impact of --

MR. WAY: Yes, I think the statement that was handed out today on behalf of the California Commission indicated that if the Lands Commission adopted the recommendations of

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 the staff, the impact could well be -- I put down \$100 million. It didn't seem to me it made much difference whether you're talking about \$90 million, \$100 million, or \$110 million. The impact would be that severe on the gas customers of California.

MR. McCAUSLAND: You mentioned that three out of five commissioners of the Public Utilities Commission urge us to set a price of \$1.20. Was that done by motion of the commission in public session, or was that a straw vote? Did the two members who did not join in that recommendation vote against it?

MR. WAY: Well, that's very complicated, and I'd hoped we wouldn't get into it. Actually, at the time the statement was presented in August, there were only three commissioners sitting at that time. Two of the commissioners agreed with the statement; the third commissioner did not and prepared his own statement.

Since then I contacted the four commissioners who were present at this time, and three of those four were for the \$1.20; the fourth commissioner was not.

MR. McCAUSLAND: So there is no public record of this as an official commission vote. That's basically my question. But you are aware that your statement --

MR. WAY: Well, I don't know. See, like I say, at the time I presented the draft statement to the commission,

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there were only three commissioners sitting at that time.

MR. McCAUSLAND: I understand,

MR. WAY: Subsequently I contacted one of the commissioners who had returned from vacation, and he sent a letter -- I think it was August the --

MR. McCAUSLAND: I understand. You don't need to go into it.

MR. WAY: -- llth of his concurrence in it, and that's the peculiar situation we're in.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Could you shed some light on the question -- the real difficulty I think we get into in this matter is the arbitration price at Occidental some time ago. If you take the standard used by that, which has been approved apparently subsequently by inaction of the court, and put it into this later time frame, you come up with these figures. Can you help us, as someone who constantly looks at the consumer side of things, how we can deal with that issue. Your statement is in essence silent, as if that arbitration never occurred. It's just a statement: fix the \$1.20. Can you help us with how we can ignore that?

MR. WAY: I must say that the California Public
Utilities Commission was a party to the court action in
San Diego to hopefully overturn the arbitration award.
It was not successful. The California Commission has over

the years had a problem in its mind with regard to the price for California wellhead gas, and that view has generally been that it has been too high. The commission at the present time has a proceeding outstanding with respect to the gas produced in northern California, with a view as to whether or not it would determine \$1.20 or some lower price was reasonable. I don't know of course what the commission is going to do. I would assume they're not going to go higher. I think PG&E did present to the commission the o.fset costs based on the \$1.20, and the commission did approve that.

I think that with the majority of the northern California producers agreeing to the \$1.20, and looking at what may be the market value, it does seem to me that that is the reasonable market value. I think bringing in costs beyond the wellhead is really not appropriate. In the staff's presentation, you're bringing in the transmission costs out of Canada, the costs of El Paso beyond the wellhead, and so on like that. I think if the staff had wanted to do a more reasonable approach and still go beyond northern California, what they should have attempted to do was to determine what the wellhead prices were in these various areas.

Of course I think the other thing you should do is relate the wellhead prices to the time production started

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 because certainly the gas consumer has a right under contracts that the utilities or pipelines may have to the gas. The only real benefit the consumer can get is by higher price for new gas yet to be discovered. It does seem to me that that does have some benefit to the consumer. But to just continually price up gas that's not entitled to higher prices doesn't really do the consumer much benefit.

CHAIRMAN CORY: The question of gas he's entitled to: there was previous testimony that there is a public policy posture of the PUC that we should minimize our consumption of California gas. Can you explain that policy and that concept? You just stated that the consumer is entitled to that older gas. They seem to be in conflict. Is that the public policy?

MR. WAY: I think at one of the hearings two years ago a question was raised -- I think it was raised by Henry Lippitt -- as to whether or not California gas should be produced at a higher rate than it was. PG&E historically has used California gas as a peaking gas. You must appreciate that compared to the gas that is now received from Canada, and the quantity of gas that's now received from El Paso, California gas is not a major item.

Of course I guess the other thing is -- at least looking at it in a more close-to-home framework -- the

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Canadians about two years ago raised the issue of curtailing gas out of Canada. Certainly that's always in the wings.

Therefore it doesn't seem to me that to some extent conserving the production of California gas is an advantage to the state.

But as I say, I think PG&E has contract commitments to produce a level of gas. They do produce it. They do use the gas primarily for peaking purposes.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I guess I don't like the dilemma I'm in with conflicting instructions in terms of how to look at this problem, and I presume you find yourself at the Public Utilities Commission in similar binds from time to time. But how can they use our gas for peaking rather than constant load if it's less expensive? I would feel far more compelled to seek \$1.20 or even 90 cents if they were showing evidence of good faith in using that first and foremost, rather than using it for peaking and using the higher priced gas.

Am I missing something? That's where I'm really having trouble deciding who's wearing the white hat in this whole mess. I'm not sure that anybody is.

MR. WAY: If you cut back on your Canadian takes, which I certainly wouldn't advise doing, and if you cut back on your takes from El Paso, which is one way of doing it, and produce California gas at a maximum, I think you

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would exhaust California gas rather quickly, because there really is not a --

CHAIRMAN CORY: But you've got to play that hand out. If you take that statement which you just said, maybe our best public policy is to jointly go to the Legislature and say, "Hey, our public policy should be to not allow these things to be produced at all. Let's save them." I don't know. Maybe that's what we should do.

But again if we look at costs, it seems to me we should arbitrarily set all state-owned gas at 90 cents and run it out as fast as we can. I don't know the answer to that.

MR. WAY: Well, I don't either. It's certainly very complicated. But as I say, there is an advantage, I think, to also being sure that you're not totally cut off from your gas supplies if Canada or somebody else curtails.

Certainly the United States government at the present time is storing sizable blocks of oil just in assurance that the Arabs won't cut --

CHAIRMAN CORY: That is just as bizarre. We're pulling out of Elk Hills, so we have oil to keep the price down, and then taking other oil and putting it in a hole in the ground. I sort of feel like no matter what I do, it's got to be wrong.

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MR. WAY: Could well be.

(Laughter.)

MR. WAY: I don't think there are easy answers to any of these questions or that there is one definitive answer.

MR. McCAUSLAND: I move we go to the Legislature and cap all the wells.

CHAIRMAN 'ORY: I'm prepared to go to the Legislature if I could figure out what the hell to ask them for. I really can't identify what the best position for the public is. I really honestly can't.

I see some inconsistencies. Your statement is very simple and very brief and sounds very nice, but the reasons you buttress it with seem to be at loggerheads with one another, and I can't figure out what the hell to do.

MR. WAY: Well, perhaps not, but the other thing you must appreciate is that gas in the ground is like money in the bank. If it's not produced, it's there. But you also must appreciate that the producers have expended a considerable amount of money to explore and develop gas that is now being produced. Certainly I think there's an entitlement on their part to recover these investments, so I think --

CHAIRMAN CORY: I'm just wondering, though: maybe we should jointly go and condemn it back. Pay them what

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they've got in it, and get out of these inane contracts we have with two middlemen. We take the people's gas, sell it to two middlemen, who make a profit on it, to sell it back to the people. Harry Truman had a word for that.

MR. WAY: I think the only one who is making a profit on it is the producers, because PG&E does not make a profit on the product they sell as a cost of gas. What they're making a profit on is their investment in the facilities to deliver the gas.

CHAIRMAN CORY: What would be the effect of that last statement, so I understand it. If we decided not to produce the gas, would their capitalized cost of that gathering system still be in their rate base or not?

MR. WAY: Yes, it would, but you must appreciate it would have an impact on the consumers in that PG&E would want to recover the cost of its facilities, which are not being used to the extent that they had previously been used. So if you did cut off the production of California gas, you would have, to some extent, a rate increase out of that.

CHAIRMAN CORY: So they've got the system rigged so that no matter what, they get the rate increase.

MR. WAY: I'm not sure it's rigged. I think it's all by law or statute as to what they're entitled to recover

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24 25 If you want to do what you want to do, it would be to pass something in the Legislature forbidding any more exploration activities beyond developmental drilling within reserves that are now known.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I don't know if that's what I want to do. I'm trying to ask you if you have any --

MR. WAY: I think that would be one way of approaching what you want to do. That would then maintain the production from the present reserves. But it could of course have an impact on --

CHAIRMAN CORY: -- long-term gas supplies.

MR. WAY: Yes, you could have an impact on the availability of gas into the future.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Staff, why don't you bring us easy problems?

MR. McCAUSLAND: Let me ask a question.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Go ahead.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Along that line of thinking, if we stayed at \$1.20, there's relatively little incentive to upgrade the production capability of the existing fields. Is there any thought in your mind that there might be adequate supplies under the ground -- that if the price were raised those fields would be producing at a higher level and consequently exhaust it sooner?

MR. WAY: Well, of course, that could well come to

leases and explore for gas.

pass. I presume that there are additional reserves to be found in California onshore. I don't think there are vast reserves such as we developed in the Delaware Basin in Texas a number of years ago, but I think there are reserves to be developed within California. Of course, that's what you'd really cut back on if you didn't go forward with allowing the parties to negotiate to purchase

Informally among the staff, we have had discussions with PG&E as to whether one approach might be to maintain a present price for California gas, and offer a higher price for new gas on or after a specific date. However -- I guess because of the framework of California gas pricing that has gone forward over the years -- nothing ever came of that.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Do you think we'd be better off if we regulated -- by the PUC or somebody -- intrastate gas prices?

MR. WAY: Perhaps if it was taken out of politics, it might work, but --

CHAIRMAN CORY: How does that happen?

MR. WAY: -- you must appreciate what happened with the Federal Power Commission. The Federal Power Commission -- I guess in around 1965 or so -- came out with their Permian decision, which was the first decision that regulated

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 the wellhead price of gas in the United States. Of course later they came out with the <u>South Louisiana</u> decision. In that determination was a reserves-to-production ratio which at that time was about 18 years. In each year that reserves-to-production declined, the Federal Power Commission did nothing. I presume that the reason they did nothing was because holding the price down had a lot of consumer appeal.

The price continued to decline. Really at that time the FPC should have taken action, but I don't think they were in a position to politically. That of course is the gambit you start to get into in governmental regulation.

CHAIRMAN CORY: But everybody is in essence, as

I hear the testimony, heaping the burden of government
regulation on us by saying that if we do anything other
than acquiesce to whatever is happening out there in that
marketplace as some industry people want to define it,
we're in essence then setting the price higher for everyone
else.

MR. WAY: Certainly the staff-recommended figures -you can appreciate yourself that it seems to me, of course,
that Henry Lippitt ought to be paying the staff rather
than the other way around.

(Laughter.)

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MR. WAY: If these figures that are being recommended were adopted, PG&E is certainly going to face them in the arbitration proceedings that are now outstanding -
I believe there are three of them -- and they're certainly going to face them in negotiations with the producers for a price on and after July 1, 1978. That's the game that you're in.

It does seem to me that it's preferable to leave a negotiation between -- as it is in northern California anyway primarily -- between PG&E and the producers as to where they want to agreeably land. I think that really the production from the state lands is only about four percent of the total production. It's not a major share. But certainly --

CHAIRMAN CORY: Statewide?

MR. WAY: Yes, I believe that's right. Certainly though, statewide -- the State Lands Commission coming out with some type of an edict would certainly be taken by everybody as a real determination, no matter how small the volume of gas is.

CHAIRMAN CORY: But we're back to that question then. It seems to me that if we don't do something to recognize the existence of the arbitration proceeding, all of the other producers in the state in the next renegotiation cycle are going to get credit for that arbitration decision

for their gas. Is there some way that the \$1.20 has a chance of prevailing, rather than the \$1.34 updated by time?

MR. WAY: I think there was testimony here by Fallin relating the arbitration award to the \$1.20. I'm not sure that there is, because of the compression --

CHAIRMAN CORY: No. I think it's important to look at the concept as I understand it. If I'm wrong, I'd appreciate getting the record clarified. It is my understanding that that arbitration award was derived by in essence using a factor formula with some adjustments afterward, but basically using Canadian gas and --

MR. WAY: That's my understanding, yes.

CHAIRMAN CORY: -- and that once that dike has been breached, the consumer is going to pay a hell of a lot more for gas. Won't the other producers in northern California during the next renegotiation period when each of these contracts come up say: "Hey, you're paying Union based on that. Why not pay me?"

Is there some way you can stop that at the PUC, to keep that from happening for the others?

MR. WAY: There are many views as to what the California Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction over California production may be, and I really don't know -- without legislation.

 CHAIRMAN CORY: If we held off, could we jointly go to the Legislature and ask for that jurisdiction, because what really bothers me is that we end up holding firm or arbitrarily setting what might be a low price, and then have everybody else in the world end up with a higher price, and us being the only ones not getting it. That seems to me to be a distinct possibility that nobody wants to consider.

If we bought some time, would the PUC support that, do you think?

MR. WAY: We'd certainly discuss it with the president of the commission. I don't think though that really with respect to the periods of time that you're determining the value of the gas at, you would be getting a price any different from the majority of the producers. Whatever the price may be starting July 1, 1978, you will know and can evaluate that price into the future.

CHAIRMAN CORY: But if we hold at \$1.20, everybody else gets \$1.91 come July 1.

MR. WAY: Right, but you can ar , because these prices, as I gathered from what the Executive Secretary read, are only good up until July 1, 1978. I could be wrong.

MR. FALLIN: Mr. Chairman, I could simplify that a little bit. The \$1.20 price was reached after the

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arbitration. That was reached with every one of those gas producers knowing that that result had been reached in the arbitration. The numbers you're fixing here will expire at roughly the same time all these renegotiated contracts will. You're going to have another prevailing price to look at at that time. You're not going to get left behind what they do.

CHAIRMAN CORY: But we're still, on July 1, 1978, left with the same problem.

MR. WAY: We all may be back.

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN CORY: That's delightful.

Okay. Any questions by the Commissioners?

Mr. Way, I appreciate your time.

MR. WAY: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I would appreciate it if you could pursue with the commissioners if they have any worthwhile suggestions. Thus far the conversations I have had with one of the commissioners really hasn't led me to any great solution to the problem. We just sit here each time wringing our hands, saying "Gee, it's terrible you have that dilemma," with sort of an understanding that "it's delightful that you have it rather than me." It seems to me that there needs to be some sort of a legislative solution to bring this thing into a realistic focus where

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the public interest might be served.

MR. WAY: We'll discuss it with our commission and then be in touch with you.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Peckham.

MR. PECKHAM: My name is Robert Peckham. I'm representing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., formerly Standard Oil Company of California.

Chevron objects to the recommended schedule of natural gas values appearing in calendar item number 19 for the reasons heretofore expressed by Chevron in its testimony presented during the pendency of the staff's hearings. My appearance here today and this statement is simply made to complete the administrative record.

I have nothing more to submit, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Any questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. Peckham.

The only other variable that needs to be put in the record, which may or may not affect our alternatives, is that both the House version and the Senate version of the bills which are being vociferously debated, as I understand it, have some mechanism to provide for a freeze or regulation of intrastate gas, which has thus far not occurred. So if we choose not to act, which is clearly that which political wisdom would dictate, we run a certain

risk of having our options curtailed or our decision made by someone else for better or for worse.

MR. FALLIN: Mr. Commissioner, I might address that just briefly. You've got to remember that the mechanism would be that it would be Standard's price which would be fixed, which would be the \$1.20. If in fact that occurs, there's nothing you can do here that's going to change it.

In other words, you could act today, and if they set a price that says that the intrastate value would be frozen as of last spring, your action will not affect that one way or the other.

CHAIRMAN CORY: But the draft, for your information, does not propose that it go back to the time including the entire time frame that we're dealing with here.

MR. FALLIN: No, that's probably true.

CHAIRMAN CORY: So that it may or may not preclude the retroactive portion of this, and that's something I wanted on the record, so the Commissioners knew.

I have not spoken with the attorneys in Washington today. I spoke with them late Tuesday and, I think, on one occasion on Wednesday. It was unclear at that time how that particular provision might be dealt with in the so-call d Jackson compromise that was being dealt with.

MR. FALLIN: It's also important to note that it won't be a direct relationship. What they'll be ruling on

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is gas sales price. Whether or not that would affect a royalty interpretation question which you wanted to have retroactively effective, I think, is still open.

CHAIRMAN CORY: The point is that the final language is not there. We may or we may not be affected, though there is some indeterminate risk, as there is in all of our decisions.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Mr. Chairman, I have to say that in all the board and commission meetings that I have sat on in the last two years, I've never heard testimony as pointedly attack the professional judgments underlying a decision. We've had vociferous debate in this Commission on the question of throughput, and after extensive testimony before us and extensive review of all available literature by each member of the Commission, we took an action on throughput. At that point any attacks focused on our professional judgment.

I'm just not willing today, on the basis of a two-page background report and an hour of totally negative testimony, to adopt the staff recommendation, without personally reviewing the record.

CHAIRMAN CORY: What kind of time frame?

MR. McCAUSL ND: Tomorrow? The next day? I don't know how long the record is, because I've never seen it.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Can the staff give some indication

1 of the order of magnitude or size of the record? 2 Are we looking at a month, the next Commission 3 meeting? Shall we set a special order? What is the size of the record? 5 MR. EVERITTS: It's about that much (indicating). б MR. WILLARD: The hearing was 140 pages. 7 CHAIRMAN CORY: Does that include the rebuttal 8 testimony? 9 MR. WILLARD: No. 10 CHAIRMAN CORY: How much is that? 11 MR. NORTHROP: I would say, Mr. Chairman, approximately 12 50 to 60 pages in rebuttal. So we're talking about 200 13 pages. MR. McCAUSLAND: Does that set forth the methodology 14 15 that was utilized and consider the other kinds of 16 methodologies that have been used, so that a layman such 17 as myself could understand the relationship between this 18 formula approach and prior formula approaches? 19 MR. NORTHROP: Do you care to address yourself to 20 that, Mr. Everitts? 21 MR. EVERITTS: It sets forth very clearly what we 22 did and the source of our data. MS. SMITH: Were memoranda of points and authorities 23 24 submitted? 25 MR. NORTHROP: I beg your pardon?

1 MS. SMITH: Memoranda of points and authorities on the definition --2 MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Stevens, that's a legal matter. 3 4 Can you answer that? 5 MR. STEVENS: No, I think this was not briefed as 6 a legal question. MS. SMITH: What about market price? 7 MR. STEVENS: This was treated as an object of 8 9 expert testimony, rather than a question of law, is my understanding 10 There would be a discussion in the record. It would 11 not be based on case authority, because apparently there 12 isn't very much if any. 13 CHAIRMAN CORY: How long would it take if you 14 anticipate a request for a formal AG's opinion on the 15 question of the definition of the marketplace and the 16 legal propriety of including the Canadian price? What 17 18 is the normal time frame on that? MR. STEVENS: I think we could supply you with a 19 letter on that subject within a week or so at the most. 20 If it were to take the form of a formal opinion, it would 21 be somewhat longer: perhaps as much as a month, because 22 of the reviews these things have to go through, and the 23

necessity of soliciting views.

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MR. McCAUSLAND: Mr. Chairman, I don't know if it's

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appropriate to ask for an executive session or not, but I would really like to explore the situation surrounding the selection of the consultant and the publicly noted criticisms that have been made here in this forum today, and whether or not we can assure ourselves that we have on the record the kinds of balanced material that we should have before us for making this decision, which is a major one.

Going back to throughput, we read every legal brief that had ever been prepared by any side on that issue, and we had as close as we could come to a well informed view of the universe of the problem we were discussing.

On this one, everyone is telling me, I guess, that if I look at the hearing record, I'm going to have a hard time seeing through a biased presentation. I don't know if I'm misunderstanding what I heard here this morning, but it makes me very nervous.

CHAIRMAN CORY: The question is: what kind of time?

I'm not sure that an executive session would be appropriate
at this point in time, because I'm not sure the nature

of --

MR. McCAUSLAND: I'd like to review the record.

CHAIRMAN CORY: The record is there. It's a question of whether we put it off till the next meeting.

MS. SMITH: If Mr. Stevens from the Attorney General's

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session could be held.

office believes that an opinion could be prepared within a month, then I think a month's delay would be appropriate, since there's no legal discussion of the issues that are

involved in making this decision in the record.

MR. STEVENS: Mr. Chairman, one possible alternative in addition, of sorts, would be the possibility of a meeting with counsel, within the context of attorney-client, in order to discuss the authority of the Commission, since this is a pending proceeding which is before it. I think this is the only circumstance under which an executive

CHAIRMAN CORY: I am not comfortable with dealing with this issue in an executive session unless there is specific litigation the other Commissioners wish to discuss. It seems to me the real issues are here before us and the parties are here. I'm somewhat confused as to how we can best serve our constitutional responsibilities and the public interest, but I'm not sure that the public interest would at all be served if we started meeting in executive session. I think that would be highly misinterpreted. I understand what you're saying, but I just think that there --

MR. McCAUSLAND: My sole suggestion had to do with the review of a personnel matter, and I withdraw the suggestion.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Was the consultant involved in the arbitration of Occidental?

MR. EVERITTS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I think he was selected -- I'm guessing, just talking out loud -- I would guess that he was selected because he was involved in that thing that went to arbitration, and the arbitration was in fact upheld by the court. The staff, as was suggested, was functioning as a landowner, trying to get the guy who could provide the best position for maximum revenue.

MR. NORTHROP: We see that as our function.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I think that's probably what they should have done. Our job is to temper those decisions with the appropriate things that the law will allow us to do. I think that's the question that's here, but I don't think there was anything untoward or inappropriate. I don't know what the man charged. One of the comments that perhaps he might have been willing to pay the state for the opportunity is perhaps well taken, maybe not. But few people contribute their time unless they have a very specific probability of return. So I'm not too chagrined at what happened. I think it's somewhat an overreaction to suggest that something untoward was going on.

What then? Next month? Leave it until Commissioners advise the staff that they are ready to deal with the issue?

MR. McCAUSLAND: I'm willing to submit to the call of the Chair on this particular matter. At any point in time at which I've had a chance to review the record, I'll be happy to make a decision.

CHAIRMAN CORY: If there was --

MS. SIEGEL: Mr. Cory, excuse me. May I request that in any rescheduling of this meeting, the parties be notified, so that we can be present with our lawyers in order to act based on your decision?

CHAIRMAN CORY: Any of those who would like that specific notice, if they could please contact the staff as to how and where you would like that notice, so we can provide that for you.

I would guess that we are not going to know any more about what the federal legislation is going to be until the last possible moment, and we could not act prior to that in any event if we don't act totally blindly. We could monitor the phone and wait for them to say, "You'd better do something" -- that's probably not feasible. So maybe we should just pay our dollar and take our choice on that end of it.

so if we want to put it off, I assume we could have an emergency meeting. If there were some new factors that came up that would compel us to act, we could probably proceed with some emergency meeting that way and notify the

appropriate parties. Otherwise, do it next month?
. SMITH: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CORY: You wish a formal Attorney General's opinion on that, and you will meet with Jan after the meeting to frame the question?

MS. SMITH: Ye.

MR. STEVENS: Mr. Chairman, if I may, in the event that such an opinion is prepared, at this time I'd like to solicit the views of Mr. Fallin and Mr. Snaider and others in the audience who have testified or may wish to contribute at the earliest possible time. Obviously the question hasn't been precisely framed, but I think we're pretty much aware of what the issues are.

MR. FALLIN: Mr. Stevens, I think I can indicate at least for myself that if we get a copy of your opinion, we can probably turn it around and have our comments and expansion on anything you do within a few days.

MR. STEVENS: We would not submit a draft. We do solicit views on the question.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Mr. Stevens is suggesting that anyone in the audience who wishes to give the Attorney General's staff the benefit of their views prior to them writing an opinion, they are willing to receive any points and authorities and information you would like to submit. He is not, I don't believe, suggesting that they

1 are going to deviate from their normal policy in allowing you to participate in the draft. I hope that's perfectly 2 understood by everyone. I think that tends to be a standard 3 4 practice of the Attorney General's office. 5 MR. STEVENS: Yes. б CHAIRMAN CORY: Okay. We may now proceed to item 20, which is off the 7 8 calendar, so we will go to item 21. MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, you have in front of 9 you a draft document on the Consolidation Report involving 10 all the lands in the jurisdiction of California. We would 11 like permission to put this out for public comment. 12 13 CHAIRMAN CORY: Without objection, it will be so 14 ordered. Item 22, City of San Mateo. 15 MR. NORTHROP: This resolves two lawsuits and some 16 17 property matters. CHAIRMAN CORY: The Attorney General is happy with 18 19 what we're doing here? MR. STEVENS: Yes, we have reviewed that transaction. 20 CHAIRMAN CORY: The compromise settlement. Without 21 22 objection, it is approved as presented. Item 23. 2.3 MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, item 23 is a housekeeping 24 cancellation of an agreement, because one agreement covers 25

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two particular pieces of property.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Arybody in the audience on item 23?
Without objection, item 23 will be approved as presented.

Item 24 is an authorization to negotiate a cutting line agreement on burned land in Siskiyou County. Anybody in the audience on this item?

Without objection, item 24 will be approved as presented.

Item 25: City of Benicia dredging permit. Is there anybody in the audience on item 25?

Without objection, the permit will be approved as presented.

Item 26: authorize acceptance of quitclaim of American Thermal Resources, Inc. Is there anybody in the audience on item 26? Any questions by members?

Without objection, item 26 will be approved as presented.

Item 27.

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, item number 27 involves two prospecting permits for approximately 3,461 acres in Boggs Mountain State Forest. This property is owned by the State Department of Forestry, and is putting up a prospecting permit to cover the entire parcel.

We feel it would be difficult to call it a known

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geothermal area, because it is three miles to the nearest producing well.

CHAIRMAN CORY: The distinction being that if it's a known geothermal area, there are different revenues which accrue to the state, but if it's a prospecting permit where a guy goes out wildcatting, he in essence has exclusive rights to the entire area if he happens to find something. Is that it?

MR. NORTHROP: If it's a known geothermal area, then we have different methods of leasing -- by net profits or some other method -- but this is the method prescribed by law.

CHAIRMAN CORY: The difficulty which I have with this concept is that we are in essence giving a preferential priority right over a relatively large piece of property for the prospecting function: 3400 acres.

How much land is involved in our entire known geyser area at the present time?

MR. NORTHROP: I'll refer that to Mr. Everitts.

MR. EVERITTS: We're probably talking about 4500, 5,000 acres in the known area.

CHAIRMAN CORY: And this is 3400, about 75 percent of the existing area, that we would be giving a preferential treatment.

MS. SMITH: Do we have any discretion as to whether

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we do this?

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MR. NORTHROP: No, we have no discretion.

CHAIRMAN CORY: This is Department of Forestry property, not ours. But by statute, we administer it.

MR. NORTHROP: I'm advised by counsel that the language is that we "shall issue".

MR. McCAUSLAND: I think we should advise the Legislature of our concern.

MR. NORTHROP: We had a bill in last year that was not very successful, but we shall try again.

MS. SMITH: I think we should go to the Legislature and ask them to change the statute so that we do have some discretion.

CHAIRMAN CORY: There is someone who wishes to speak to us on this item: Clyde Kahn; is that correct?

MR. KUHN: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. name is Clyde Kuhn, a member of the Society for California Archaeology, but I'm not representing that organization today. I'm speaking as a member of the scientific community.

It is my understanding of the proposed undertaking as outlined in the draft final EIR that the total acreage of Boggs Mountain will be open for geothermal prospecting under the State Lands Commission -- that's exactly what you said. The draft EIR clearly indicated that physical

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manifestations of past human activity -- or in other words, archaeological, historical and prehistoric features -- are present within the boundaries of the entire state forest. These concerns were brought forth before the State Lands Division in a review of the draft EIR. The Lands Division commissioned a limited archaeological study of proposed drill sites within the forest, but no steps, to my knowledge, have been taken to evaluate similar features within the entire forest, in spite of the fact that the acknowledged area of permit authorization is the entire forest, and not only specific drill sites. Furthermore, the Lands Division-commissioned archaeological study was so limited in scope that sufficient data was not collected with which to adequately evaluate the significance or scope of cultural resources at the specific drill sites.

Lastly, the Native American community, and specifically the California State Native-American Heritage Commission, has not been consulted in the identification of possible sites of cultural heritage within the area of potential impact, nor in the assessment of potential impact upon such features growing out of or reasonably expected at this stage of the undertaking.

The State Lands Division's final EIR does not address these issues. The final EIR does contain a copy of the archaeological report commissioned by the Lands

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Division, and references such study for all concerns expressed with respect to cultural and scientific heritage as if all issues of concern had been solved by this clearly limited study. They have not.

It is my understanding that state agencies — and specifically the Office of Historic Preservation of the Department of Parks and Recreation, and the Executive Secretary's office of the Native-American Heritage Commission — as well as archaeologists and the general public, have expressed concern over these issues to the Lands Division. Mitigation measures contained in the final EIR do not set forth adequate steps for the evaluation, protection and recovery of cultural and scientific value within the area of permit authorization. The steps are not adequate to evaluate these values within the area of current authorization and the project's acknowledged potential environmental impact in a manner consistent with CEQA and state EIR guidelines.

To rectify this inadequacy, the entire project surface area -- in this case the 3,462 acres -- of potential permit has to be examined and inventoried in detail on foot under the supervision of archaeologists. An identification of the social, scientific and cultural values of the project area must be made on the basis of some provisional understanding of the temporal and spatial

circumstances and environmental setting of past human activity.

Such understanding is obtained through an interdisciplinary and temporal overview of the regional non-cultural environment, history and ethnology. Upon this understanding, a determination of the significance of cultural resources and non-cultural physical and environmental associations essential to understanding the context and duration of past human activity within and adjoining the project area has to be made well in advance of the permit decision and incorporated in the published evaluation of environmental impacts, in order to afford the general and professional public the opportunity to consider all potential impacts, the significance of threatened resources, and all methods available to avoid or minimize adverse impact.

In addition, concerned members of the local Native American community and the State Native-American Heritage Commission must be consulted in order to ascertain whether or not areas of cultural significance to that community will be impacted by the project.

I urge you to suspend any permit plans for Boggs Mountain for geothermal purposes until such time as a complete cultural resource surface intensive examination of the proposed project area has been made.

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I would also like to take this opportunity to express dissatisfaction over the Lands Division's treatment of and response to concerns expressed over this proposed undertaking. It is not in the public interest to sacrifice the people's heritage or to set aside the concerns of the public for the sake of administratively expediting an energy undertaking of considerable anxiety not only to the local community, but to the community at large of the state.

Nevertheless, my interaction with the Lands Division has indicated a deliberate and consistent insensitivity to public concerns and the public interest. For example, I have been advised by Mr. Northrop that expressing such concerns is (quote) "not in keeping with law" (unquote), and it is not in the public interest to fund a comprehensive study of cultural resources at Boggs Mountain, in spite of the fact that the project's acknowledged potential impact could very clearly affect such resources.

Who in the heck is Mr. Northrop that he has the right to dictate the public interest? I understand that these interests are still sovereign to the people and their elected representatives in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and the constitution of the state of California

A last example -- but by no means exhausting all possible examples of the Lands Commission's apparent

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circumvention of concerns -- is selective editing of concerns expressed in response to the Boggs Mountain draft EIR in the final EIR. How can the public possibly hope to assess the environmental issues and impact of such an undertaking in accordance with CEQA guidelines if the Lands Division exercises a purposeful censorship of this nature?

CHAIRMAN CORY: Are there questions by members of the Commission?

MR. McCAUSLAND: One of the findings which we have to make on page 73 of our agenda is to certify that the final Environmental Impact Report has been completed in compliance with CEQA, as amended, and the state guidelines, and that the Commission has reviewed and considered the information contained therein. I believe that your testimony suggests that the information contained therein is --

MR. KUHN: Not to my understanding, sir.

MR. McCAUSLAND: -- less than adequate.

MR. KUHN: Not to my understanding. Certainly not to my definition and understanding.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Mr. McCausland is suggesting that your position is that the EIR is inadequate and insufficient

MR. KUHN: That is correct.

MS. SMITH: Jan, have you reviewed the EIR?

MR. STEVENS: I have not, Commissioner. I did have

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a question with respect to the nature of the project, which perhaps could be cleared up now. It's my understanding that this is a so-called first stage EIR, and that if more intensive development and exploration were to occur, another EIR would have to be prepared. There is substantial authority to that effect.

It is further indicated, both in the Commission's action and in the Executive Officer's report, that only two drill sites of approximately one acre each would be used in this initial exploratory stage. There is a little ambiguity on that, because the response to the EIR, which appears on page 12 of "Issues and Responses", says that five potential drill sites were selected jointly. I wonder if that could be cleared up: if in fact we're only authorizing two drillings in approximately one acre localities at this time within the scope of this particular EIR.

MR. EVERITTS: The sites were originally selected on the basis that they were badly damaged from timber operations, or -- Forestry pointed out: here are five spots that we don't mind if you drill wells on, because it isn't going to affect our forest operations. So based then on the preliminary work, they plan on picking two of the five sites to drill on.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Where is the Division of Forestry?

What agency? Is it within the Resources Agency? 1 MR. EVERITTS: It's the Department of Forestry now. 2 Right, the Department of Forestry MR. NORTHROP: 3 It was in Conservation, but now Mr. Moran heads it 4 5 up in its own area. CHAIRMAN CORY: And Knox is with Parks and Rec? 6 MR. NORTHROP: Yes, he is with the Department of 7 Parks and Recreation. 3 MR. KUHN: Mr. Cory, could I say something? CHAIRMAN CORY: Yes. 10 This whole process, the whole issue of MR. KUHN: 11 where the wells are going to be drilled, is really 12 irrelevant to the problem at the present time. The permit, 13 as I understand it, involves geophysical exploration 14 throughout the entire state forest. Is that correct, sir? 15 MR. EVERITTS: The terms of the lease, or the 16 conditions which Forestry set down, were that it would be 17 throughout the forest, but we could not get off of existing 18 No new roads could be constructed. 19 CHAIRMAN CORY: Let me back up so I can understand. 20 This is Department of Forestry property. They decided 21 what they wanted to do, and then they bounced it to us? 22 MR. EVERITTS: No, sir. They own the land and the 23 minerals, but by Public Resources Code the State Lands 24

Commission has the responsibility of administering those

minerals under terms and conditions set by the surface owner -- or Forestry.

CHAIRMAN CORY: But in terms of trying to put it in perspective for the public here, we are functioning in a limited sense under the direction of Forestry; is that correct?

MR. EVERITTS: They have written their own regulations and established conditions to be used, and they stated they're anxious to determine whether there are such geothermal resources there.

MR. KUHN: Can I respond to that?

CHAIRMAN CORY: Yes.

MR. KUHN: To my understanding, sir, it's a very clearcut case. The State Lands Commission proposes to give a permit for exploration of this territory under the jurisdiction of another agency.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Let me try to clarify that. As I understand it, we are required by law to issue a permit. Now is that correct, or do we have discretion?

MR. HIGHT: Mr. Chairman, the section reads that the Commission "shall execute lease to qualified applicants" a prospecting permit to qualified applicants. So yes, the discretion seems to be very limited.

CHAIRMAN CORY: It is bad law. That's what we started with.

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24 25 If you would come in here first and ask for it, the prospecting permit --

MR. KUHN: In other words --

CHAIRMAN CORY: -- we would either have had to exclude you as being an unqualified applicant, or we'd have to issue you the permit.

MR. KUHN: In other words, you have no option when someone approaches you with an application.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Yes. We tried to get that changed in the Legislature last year. That which Mr. Northrop says the law is -- he doesn't like it, but he has to do it.

MR. KUHN: Given the fact that the permit will have to be issued, there still is a necessity of meeting certain standards.

CHAIRMAN CORY: That's correct, and we'd like to use those as best we can.

MR. KUHN: Again, to go back to the nature of the undertaking, there will be certain specific sites, apparently two sites for the drilling of deep geothermal wells. But there are other operations which will occur within the boundaries of the forest under the terms of the permit, which would not occur if the permit were not given: geophysical explorations.

It seems they may involve only current roads. There is no evidence indicated, to my knowledge, in the final or

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draft EIR that would make that specifically spelled out, to indicate the only other impacts that would occur.

MR. EVERITTS: Well, as a matter of record, that is a fact. Further, the applicant is aware of it and knows that they will have to do a detailed archaeological study at the actual drill sites picked. We certainly have no objection, and the applicant has no objection, to having some qualified archaeologist observe these things.

There will be certain environmental MR. KUHN: impacts that do not seem to have been addressed as far as archaeology and heritage concerns that need to be addressed. according to my understanding of CEQA, in that environmental document. If I'm wrong, fine. But it seems to me that I am right, and this information has indeed not been met in the manner that is expected.

CHAIRMAN CORY: Mr. McCausland has a question.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Page 6 of the executive summary of the Environmental Impact Report, which happens to be the only portion of the Environmental Impact Report that I have reviewed, stipulates quite clearly in the eighth line: "No impact will occur on sites of archaeological and/or historical value, because no e exist on the sites specific", period. That is a fairly closed-loop piece of information. Can someone stipulate to that?

MR. STEVENS: I believe it's also set forth in the

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conditions imposed by the Department of Forestry, which is Exhibit C here: well-drilling sites for each well have to be developed and approved in writing before operation begins. This applies to drilling.

There is an additional requirement that no new roads will be constructed for geologic or seismic activities.

MR. McCAUSLAND: But I'd like an answer to my question. Someone someplace has specified in writing, and I'm about to say that they specified the right thing. He specifically states: "No impact will occur on sites of archaeological or historical value, because none exist on the sites specific."

CHAIRMAN CORY: And the gentleman who is here from the public is suggesting that that is contrary to fact.

MR. KUHN: Yes. As a matter of fact, the final EIR contains information -- the Lands Division asked to have a consultant actually look at the site, and there was cultural debris present on some of the sites. I don't remember how many of the five --

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. McCausland, in response to your question, Mr. Charles Priddy ard Mr. Don Hoagland worked on that EIR and are familiar with it. They can probably address that, because they were on the ground.

MR. HOAGLAND: My name is Don Hoagland. I'm with the geothermal unit.

Mr. McCausland, in partial response to your question, two things have occurred here: (1) the draft seeking certain information on environmental impacts, and then the hearing process in which new facts evolved in the final. The statement you read, I admit, is a little bold. In subsequent information we did determine, through the study mentioned by Mr. Kuhn, that there were some rchaeological values found at two sites. I think Mr. Everitts indicated that subsequently we suggested that a limited study be done on those two sites if those sites are selected after surficial exploration.

I think it should be pointed out that this is an exploratory permit, and as such, we don't know at this time which of the sites will be selected. The permittee cannot walk on the land or do any surficial exploration until he has a permit from this Commission. Therefore, to talk about the impacts on any of the sites -- we don't know which sites are going to be selected.

CHAIRMAN CORY: I'm not willing to take this matter up at this time. There are questions as to the sufficiency. I am philosophically disposed against prospecting permits generally, which may in fact be clouding my judgment. For that reason, what I'd like to do is put it over, if the other Commissioners agree, for some unspecified period while we try to resolve what the facts are.

I think if both Mr. Kuhn and Mr. Northrop and Mr. Hoagland in future meetings try to listen to each other, I think we as a Commission will have to spend less time on this item, because I detect a certain communication problem in terms of what was said about what we can and cannot do and in terms of our concern with the law. I detect a certain amount of lack of listening on the part of our staff in terms of what he was trying to tell us.

If we both do that, maybe next time this is before us, it can be disposed of with a little more alacrity.

I'm not mad at anybody, but there just seems to be a mild communication problem. I think I know

Mr. Hoagland and Mr. Northrop and where their heads are at.

I'm thinking that when Mr. Northrop refers to the law,

it's because he's a little ticked off. He doesn't like

the law the way it is, and he tried to change it and can't.

You perhaps reacted to him as being hostile to your purposes. I hope that's not the case, and I hope you can get together. If you have trouble, give me a call, and I'll try to negotiate those differences.

MR. KUHN: I'll make myself available. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORY: If the staff would try to get at that and get back to the Commissioners as to the adequacy of the EIR before we recalendar, that will give us a clearer understanding of where we are. At the same time we

1 should probably give the Commissioners a staff report 2 as to where the difficulty of changing the statute in 3 this matter came from and how we might overcome those 4 difficulties. 5 Moving right along, item 28: request for authorizaб tion to offer by competitive bidding --7 MR, CONFORTE: Excuse me. Could I address the 8 issue of Geothermal Kinetics' permit? 9 CHAIRMAN CORY: Sure. We've blown enough of the 10 day. 91 (Laughter.) 12 MR. CONFORTE: I don't wish to take up a lot of 13 your time. 14 MR. NORTHROP: Could you give your name, please? 15 MR. CONFORTE: My name is Frank Conforte, and I 16 work for Geothermal Kinetics. 17 The discussion has centered on the archaeological 18 rescurces at the sites. It has also been pointed out 19 that geophysical exploration would occur over the entire 20 state forest. 21 Well, as has been pointed out, it wouldn't actually 22 occur over the entire state forest, because no new road 2.3 construction would be involved. I think from that, 24 archaeological damage is not really a problem.

In terms of the drill sites that were addressed,

the archaeology report that was done by a member of —

I believe it was the Sonoma State archaeology department
as a result of the comments made at the hearing on

January 13th, 1977, listed the findings at these five sites.
There were some archaeological findings. Those are, for
drill site one, one flake of obsidian and one unmodified
obsidian pebble located at the site. Drill site two was
eliminated and therefore not considered. Drill site three:
two obsidian flakes and one unmodified obsidian pebble
were discovered in the bulldozer backdirt. This had
apparently already been severely disturbed by logging
operations.

Drill site four: two artifact fragments were noted in the area, as well as one small obsidian flake. Drill site five: one projectile point fragment was noted in the area.

In addition to the drill sites, the top of the low ridge between drill sites four and five was examined --very briefly examined, to use the exact wording. The entire ridge top had been recently burned and cleared. One projectile point fragment was noted in the cursory examination of this area.

I guess what I'm basically asking is: this application has been in process for quite a long period of time, and I understand fully your desire to ensure that the requirements

of CMQA and of your own public trust are met. When no time limit for this continuance of the process seemed to have been arrived at, I was wondering if that was possible. Is it possible to establish some time frame within which we can know whether this is going to go? We're quite anxious. We've been waiting for years.

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ACTING CHAIRMAN McCAUSLAND: The specific answer to your question is: yes, it would be possible to set a time certain. The secondary answer to your question is I believe that the Chairman requested staff to also report to him on an equally important matter to him, which represents the entire question of the Commission's posture on the future of leases or prospecting permits that have such long-term ramifications to the future contractual relationship between the state and prospecting parties. So I believe that to answer your question in all fairness: while it is possible for us to set a time certain, it is not the intent of the Commission at this time to limit its options.

MR. CONFORTE: I understand your concern about the leasing process in terms of what your obligations are to the citizens of the state of California. Even in regard to that, I had hoped that this might be possible to get a time certain. Apparently you indicate it is not.

ACTING CHAIRMAN McCAUSLAND: That's probably why the

chairman stepped out of the room for a minute.

I understand. This Commission is quite concerned about making decisions in a timely fashion, and I think we will do everything we can to encourage the staff to come back to us if at all possible on the next agenda, and if not, as soon thereafter as possible. But you have to understand that in this particular instance we're also interested in pursuing this matter with the Legislature and discussing the entire relationship of the development of the state's geothermal resources not just on Boggs Mountain, but throughout the state. I'm afraid that your prospecting permit may in fact be the bellwether of a significant controversy that may range over the entire prospecting process.

MR. CONFORTE: I'm sure the company is more than honored --

(Laughter.)

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MR. CONFORTE: -- to be the kickoff for that particular argument.

If I might clarify a point, it is my understanding that that argument was raised last year or the year before with the Legislature, the question of the leasing procedure?

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sway is our legislative person. He can address this.

MR. SWAY: I am Brian Sway, legislative coordinator

for the Commission.

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Geothermal legislation being carried by Senator Sieroty
-- I mean Senator Roberti -- is out of the Senate now
and before the Assembly. It does deal with prospecting
permits and the discretion of the Commission, and modifies
it. I'd be happy to share a copy with you --

MR. CONFORTE: If you would, please.

MR. SWAY: -- and an analysis of the bill. It is on its way. It is before the Assembly and will be taken up in January.

ACTING CHAIRMAN McCAUSLAND: Item 28, mineral extraction: request for authorization to offer by competitive public bidding some 6880 acres of sovereign land in Owens Lake for a mineral extraction lease. Is there anyone in the audience who wishes to testify on item 28?

If not, without objection item 28 will be approved.

Item 29, Long Beach operation: approve the Final Report and Closing Statement of the 1976-77 Plan of Development and Operations and Budget, Long Beach Unit, Wilmington Oil Field.

MR. THOMPSON: Briefly, this is a summary of last year's operations in the Long Beach Unit.

ACTING CHAIRMAN McCAUSLAND: I notice you're coming out much richer than you went in. Is that because you haven't learned how to spend money faster?

MR. THOMPSON: Basically that's the problem we were discussing before of the drilling contract. We were not able to keep our rigs going, so therefore our expenditures were down.

The original budget approved was \$62 million. With the carry-in, that became \$66 million, which you later augmented then up to the final level of approximately \$75 million.

ACTING CHAIRMAN McCAUSLAND: Without objection, item 29 is approved.

Item 30: approval of bid specification for crude oil sell-offs in the Long Beach Harbor Department. Anybody in the audience wishing to testify on item 30?

Why don't you make a brief presentation on item 30, please?

MR. THOMPSON: This is Commission approval of notices inviting bids, bid forms, and crude oil sell-off contracts to use in the contemplated sell-off of the royalty oil taken in kind from these two particular City of Long Beach parcels.

ACTING CHATRMAN McCAUSLAND: We are not approving the sale contract itself. We're merely approving the notice and bid forms relevant to that; is that right?

MR. THOMPSON: You're approving the context of the contracts. The actual award will be made sometime in

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the future.

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I'd like to go into why this would have to be done. In the first place, we now have existent sell-off contracts on these parcels. They were started back in 1972 and were to expire in 1975, but because of the FEA energy regulations, you have to continue the supplier-purchaser relationship. You can't stop those.

In about 1974 then, there was also a ruling in which we could not receive a bonus. These particular contracts were a bonus over posted price. In '74 they ruled that we could not get this bonus; therefore, we could only collect ceiling price or posted price, whichever was the smaller. Up until 1976 these were the same. At that particular time the posted price did not follow ceiling price; we were about 60 cents below.

So at the present time we have these contracts in existence in which we can collect thirty-two cents and twenty-six and a half cents over the posted price. However, on this eight-percent parcel, the present taker is not paying this bonus, and we'll have to take legal action against them.

So to change this existing supplier-purchaser relationship, you must get a bonafide offer that 12 higher, and then you give the present taker right of first refusal. If he will match that offer, then he may continue in this

relationship. If not, you award it to the person who has a higher bonafide offer.

ACTING CHAIRMAN McCAUSLAND: Without objection, item 30 is approved.

Item 31: find that the resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of the East Bay Regional Park District for Martinez regional shoreline conforms with the requirements of the granting statute. Is there anyone who wishes to testify on item 31?

If not, it stands approved without objection.

Item 32, contracts: authorize the Executive Officer to enter into an Interagency Service Agreement with the Department of Parks and Recreation. Is there anyone wishing to testify on item 32?

If not, without objection item 32 is approved.

Item 33: authorize the Executive Officer to enter into a Standard Agreement with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Is there anyone wishing to testify on item 33?

Without objection, item 33 is approved.

Item 34, litigation: authorization to file Disclaimer of Interest in the case of <u>U.S.A. v. 440 Acres Of Land</u>, <u>More Or Less</u>. Is there anyone in the audience wishing to testify on item 34?

Without objection, item 34 is approved.

Item 35, subventions to cities and counties: authorize

the reporting to the State Controller of the subventions for the 1977-78 fiscal year. Is there anyone in the audience wishing to testify on item 35?

Without objection, item 35 is approved.

Item 36: Bair Island Environmental Study, a request for extension of Bair Island Environmental Study Agreement in Redwood City, San Mateo County. Anyone to testify on item 36?

Without objection, item 36 is approved.

Item 37, sublease of land: Anza Shareholders' Liquidating Trust.

Mr. Northrop.

MR. NORTHROP: Mr. Chairman, Miss Smith, this is a request by Anza Pacific to sublease some state lands, and Mr. Trout from our land section will address himself to that.

MR. TROUT: I think in view of the time, unless you have questions: we had a boundary settlement. The people we had the settlement with are now attempting to get out of the business there, and they are attempting to sublease the existing leases, and this is one of them, which buld provide development of a restaurant, dance hall, card room, a few things like that, on a piece of property.

(Laughter.)

MR. STEVENS: Both public trust uses.

MR. STEVENS: Both publi

1 MR. TROUT: I think the staff feels that they are all consistent with the trust. 2 3 ACTING CHAIRMAN McCAUSLAND: Is there anyone wishing 4 to testify on 37? 5 Without objection, 37 is approved. 6 Does that bring us to the end of our agenda? 7 Without objection, the Commission will stand 8 adjourned until the next meeting, October 27th, 1977. (Thereupon the meeting of the State Lands 9 Commission was adjourned at 1:30 p.m.) TO 11 --000--12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19. 20 21 22 23 24 25


State of California)
) ss.
County of Sacramento)

I, PAUL D. RAMSHAW, a Notary Public in and for the County of Sacramento, State of California, duly appointed and commissioned to administer oaths, do hereby certify:

That I am a disinterested person herein; that the foregoing State Lands Commission Meeting was reported in shorthand by me, Paul D. Ramshaw, a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of California, and thereafter transcribed into typewriting.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for any of the parties to said meeting, nor in any way interested in the outcome of said meeting.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office this 6th day of Older 1977.



Paul D. Ramshaw
Notary Public in and for the
County of Sacramento, State of

California C.S.R. License No. 3434